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PERMITTED BUT NOT INTENDED:
BOUB V. TOWNSHIP OF WAYNE,
MUNICIPAL TORT IMMUNITY IN ILLINOIS,
AND THE RIGHT TO LOCAL TRAVEL
BRUCE EPPERSON*

I.

INTRODUCTION

A. Background
On September 8, 1992, Jon Boub, an experienced cyclist and
triathlete, rode his bicycle through Wayne Township, a semi-rural
area in DuPage County on the western fringe of the Chicago
metropolitan area. His daily training circuit took him across an
old, one-lane bridge on St. Charles Road. The bridge was surfaced
with wooden planks, between which asphalt "caulking" had been
applied to prevent gaps. Vandals sometimes stole the planks, so
the township's road supervisor ordered the installation of a new
road surface. Work started that morning, and the caulking had
been removed by the end of the day. No signage or barricades
were installed when the crew went home, and cars continued to
use the bridge without incident throughout the evening. The
bridge was at the bottom of a hill; Mr. Boub was traveling between
thirty-three and thirty-five miles per hour as he approached it.
About halfway across, his front wheel fell into a gap between two
. Associate Attorney, Donna M. Ballman, P.A., 4801 S. University Drive,
Suite 3010, Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33328, (954) 815-2972, BruceEpp@aol.com.

J.D., Shepard Broad Law Center, Nova Southeastern University; B.S.,
University of Kansas; M.U.R.P., University of Colorado. The author thanks
Jon A. Duncan, Esq. and John Stainthorp, Esq., for their assistance in
reviewing earlier drafts of this Article. Both gentlemen participated in the
preparation of Jon Boub's appellate briefs, and were able to point out several
errors and omissions. A portion of this Article was prepared under the
supervision of Michael Masinter of the Shepard Broad Law Center, who
permitted the definition of "civil rights law" to be stretched to the limit to
accommodate its preparation under the guise of a seminar paper.
1. This introduction is taken from: Boub v. Township of Wayne, 684
N.E.2d 1040 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) [hereinafter Boub I]; Eric Petersen & Gin
Kilgore, Illinois Bicycle Advocacy Groups and the Law: Struggling with the
Boub Decision 5 (2004) (unpublished manuscript, Chicago Area
Transportation Study); and HUGH TRAVIS CULLEY, THE IMMORTAL CLASS 256
(2001).
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The St. Charles Road bridge
Photo courtesy of Chicagoland Bicycle Federation and the League of Illinois
Bicyclists.
planks and he was thrown onto the bridge railing. He suffered a
concussion, three herniated discs, a fractured hip, a crushed pelvic
joint, a torn ligament in his left foot and a dislocated shoulder.
After insurance, Mr. Boub's out-of-pocket medical and
rehabilitation expenses totaled almost $50,000.
He filed a complaint in Illinois state court against Wayne
Township alleging six counts. Only Counts I and II are considered
in this Article.
The first count asserted that the township
negligently failed to maintain the bridge in a reasonably safe
condition for his use as required by title 745, section 10/3-102(a) of
the Illinois Compiled Statutes' (sections of title 745 of the Illinois
Compiled Statutes are hereinafter referred to only by section
number), and the second count asserted that the township created
an unreasonably dangerous condition as defined by section 10/3103(a).3
The township moved for summary judgment on all six counts,
maintaining that, under Illinois law, they owed no duty of care to

2. This section provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this Article, a local public entity has the
duty to exercise ordinary care to maintain its property in a reasonably
safe condition for the use in the exercise of ordinary care of people whom
the entity intended and permitted to use the property in a manner in

which and at such times as it was reasonably foreseeable that it would
be used....

745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/3-102(a) (2002).
3. This section provides:
A local public entity is not liable under this Article for an injury caused
by the adoption of a plan or design of a construction of, or an

improvement to public property where the plan or design has been
approved in advance of the construction or improvement by the
legislative body of such entity....
745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/3-103(a).
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a bicyclist on the bridge and were absolutely immune from
liability. The motion was based on a provision within section 10/3102(a), which states that a local government is liable only to
"permitted and intended" users of its public facilities.
The
township maintained that while Mr. Boub was a permitted user,
he was not an intended user. The trial court granted summary
judgment, and Mr. Boub appealed to the state's second district
appellate court, which upheld the decision. The Illinois Supreme
Court agreed to hear the case on February 4, 1998. 4
Oral arguments were heard on June 30 and a decision
upholding the appellate court was handed down on October 22,
1998." The supreme court issued a four-to-three decision, with
Justice Heiple writing a sharp dissent. Although the decision was
intricate, it contained four core elements: 1) an "intended" user of
a local roadway could only be determined by the most local level of
government, as exhibited by "physical manifestations of intent,"
such as signage and roadway markings; 2) "intention" defined
classes of users, not types of use-however, all unintended users
were, by definition, engaged in unforeseeable activities; 3) intent
was an element in the municipality's duty of care, and was thus a
question of law to be determined by the court; and 4) the "enormity
of the burden" to the municipality could be considered as a factor
in determining if a user was intended or merely permitted.
Shortly after the decision, the Illinois Public Risk
Management Association (an insurance cooperative for small
governments) informed its policyholders that it would not cover
loss on roadways marked for bicycle use. Many townships along
the Grand Illinois Trail, a statewide network of bicycle routes,
removed signage designating the trail, and the Illinois
Department of Natural Resources withdrew from participation in
the development of the multi-state Mississippi River Trail.'
Illinois bicycle advocacy groups twice attempted a legislative
circumvention of the Boub ruling; both failed in the face of strong
opposition by the Illinois Municipal League (who wanted no
change from the status quo) and the Illinois Trial Lawyers
Association (who sought the total elimination of local immunity).
This Article explores an alternative strategy to judicially
confront the local governmental immunity of section 10/3-102 as
unconstitutional under either the Illinois or federal constitution,
using two existing federal civil rights statutes, 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
and 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Section 1983 permits litigation against a
government entity that deprives a citizen of rights guaranteed

4.
5.
Boub
6.

Boub v. Township of Wayne, 690 N.E.2d 1379 (Ill. 1998).
Boub v. Township of Wayne, 702 N.E.2d 535 (Ill. 1998) [hereinafter
II].
Peterson & Kilgore, supra note 1, at 8-9.
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under the U.S. Constitution,7 and § 1985 permits private action
against any party that conspires to deprive any person or class of
persons of equal protection.8 Two different tactics are evaluated.
First, the potential for bringing action based on a deprivation of a
right of localized travel is explored. Although the United States
Supreme Court has not explicitly enunciated such a right, this
Article will argue that Supreme Court dicta and recent federal
case law (tacitly supported by the high court) indicate a strong
propensity to recognize such a right. Second, the possibility of
seeking redress under federal or state equal protection and due
process provisions is explored. Equal protection in Illinois is
unique. For over a century, equal protection was guaranteed by a
state constitution provision prohibiting special legislation. 9
Although Illinois adopted a separate equal protection clause when
it rewrote its constitution in 1970, it considered the special
legislation protection so important that it retained the provision. 10
As a result, while equal protection challenges in the state are
evaluated using criteria identical to that in its federal
counterpart," equal protection in Illinois has always had a
historical resonance with the citizenry when the legislature
2
confers benefits on less than a statewide
basis."
Significantly, this
3
immunity.
includes government
B. Organizationof the Article
This Article is divided into four sections. The first is this
introduction. The second explores the legislative and judicial
history of local government tort immunity in Illinois from 1898 to

7. Section 1983 specifically states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,

custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any

rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress....
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).

8. Section 1985 states:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in
disguise on the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose
of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons
of the equal protection of the laws.., the party so injured or deprived
may have an action for the recovery of damages....
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).
9. Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1070 (Ill. 1997).
10. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 13 (1970).
11. Melbourne Corp. v. City of Chicago, 394 N.E.2d 1291, 1301 (Ill. App. Ct.
1979).
12. Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1069.
13. Id.
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the present. Particular emphasis is placed on a group of cases
from 1973 to 1997 that are referred to here as the "pedestrian
cases." An examination of the pedestrian cases indicates that the
Boub case was not a judicial aberration, but a logical extension of
precedent. The second section concludes with a detailed look at
the Boub case and the judicial decisions that later relied on it. The
third section discusses the possible existence of a constitutional
right of local travel, which has variously been termed "mobility"
and "local movement." The concluding section offers a blueprint
for applying the federal civil rights statutes to future cases that
result from the application of Boub and its progeny. The proposed
right of local travel is, of course, featured, but the section also
evaluates possible alternatives that rely on currently recognized
constitutional rights.
C. A Word on Nomenclature
In 1970 the State of Illinois rewrote its constitution and in
1992 reorganized its state statutes. References within the Article,
depending on the date of origin, may use either the old or new
statutory system. The table below contains the most frequently
referenced statutory sections in this Article.
Pre-1992
Const. Art 4 § 22
Const. Art. 4 § 26

Subject
Post-1992
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Prohibited special
laws
Const. Art. 4 § 13
laws

State sovereign
immunity
STATUTORY PROVISIONS

Const. Art. 13 § 4

Notes
Modified
19f0
1970

Modified
1970

(Ill. Rev. Stat.)

(ILCS)
ch. 34 8 301.1

none

ch. 85
ch. 85 § 3-102

745 Act 10
745 10/3-102

ch. 85 § 3-103

745 10/3-103

ch. 85 § 3-106

745 10/3-106

ch. 85 § 9-103
ch. 122 § 29-11

745 10/9-103
none

Recreational tort
liability
Local govt. tort
immunity
Care in maintenance
Adoption of plan or
design
Propty. used for rec.
services
Insurance contracts
School bus insurance

ch. 122 §§ 821-31
ch. 122 § 823
ch. 122 § 825

745 25/1-11
753 1/3
750

Tort liab. of schools
Tort liab. of schools
Tort liab. of schools

Unconst.
1964

to 745
10/9-103

The most frequently referenced statutes in this Article are in

The John MarshallLaw Review

[38:545

Chapter 745, Act 10, Article III of the Illinois Compiled Statutes.' 4
The current name of this section is the Local Governmental and
Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act, but it has been
incorporated in Illinois statutes under a number of different
names over the years. As a generic label for those sections of
Illinois statutes regulating the immunity of local governments
from tort liability, I use two older names, the Illinois Tort Liability
Act (or "ITLA") and the Tort Immunity Act. I use these to refer to
both the pre-1992 Illinois Revised Statutes and the current Illinois
Compiled Statutes. Where it is necessary for clarity to use a
precise heading name, I have used the one in force at the time a
particular case was decided or a legislative act debated.
Finally, for brevity, I shall refer to the two Boub v. Township
of Wayne cases as Boub I (the Illinois Appellate Court, Second
District) 5 and Boub 11 (the Illinois Supreme Court). 6 If no
distinction is made, the supreme court opinion is implied. All
citations to the briefs filed by the parties and friends of the court
are for the supreme court case. References by Illinois appellate
courts to Boub after October, 1998 are almost always to the
supreme court case; where a reference is to the earlier appellate
court opinion, I have specifically noted it.
II. LOCAL

GOVERNMENT TORT IMMUNITY IN ILLINOIS

A. LegislatingLocal Government Immunity in Illinois, 1959-1965
In 1898, the Illinois Supreme Court created a common law
tort immunity for the negligent acts of local governments. 7 The
immunity was an extension of the state's immunity contained in
Article IV, section 26 of the Illinois Constitution. 8 However, the
state supreme court abolished common law local immunity in 1959
in Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No. 302.1' A

14. 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/3-101 to 10/3-110.
15. 684 N.E.2d 1040 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997). The Illinois Constitution provides
for only one Appellate Court. The Illinois Appellate Court is divided into five
non-autonomous, geographic districts, and the First District (located in
Chicago, covering all of Cook County) is further divided into divisions. The
author thanks Jon Duncan for this clarification.
16. 702 N.E.2d 535 (Ill. 1998).
17. Molitor v. Kaneland Cmty. Unit Dist. No. 302, 163 N.E.2d 89, 90-91 (Ill.
1959); Comment, Illinois Tort Claims Act: A New Approach to Municipal Tort
Immunity in Illinois, 61 Nw. U. L. REV. 265 (1966) [hereinafter Illinois Tort
ClaimsAct].
18. "The state of Illinois shall never be made defendant in any court of law
or equity." This provision was deleted in the 1970 constitution and replaced
with Article XIII, § 4: "Except as the General Assembly may provide by law,
sovereign immunity in this State is abolished." ILL. CONST. art. XIII, § 4
(1970).
19. 163 N.E.2d 89.
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school bus ran off the road, struck a culvert, and exploded, burning
several students. Writing for the majority, Illinois Supreme Court
Justice Klingbiel stated that "[tihe whole doctrine of governmental
20
a rotten foundation"
immunity for liability for torts rests upon
and concluded that "we 21have not only the power, but the duty, to
abolish that immunity."
In July 1959, a month after Molitor, the Illinois General
Assembly adopted a series of statutes limiting the tort liability of
park districts, counties, forest preserves, the Chicago Park
The legislature used two very
District, and school districts.
districts, forest preserves, and
park
different strategies. Counties,
absolute tort immunity for
received
District
the Chicago Park
2
districts was capped at
school
of
liability
the
negligence, while
24
was not included,
Death
damage.
property
$10,000 for injury or
maximum of $30,000.25
statutory
death
wrongful
the
to
defaulting
The absolute immunity extended to counties and park
26
districts was invalidated in 1964 in Harvey v. Clyde Park District.
A young boy suffered injuries from a playground slide negligently
maintained by a local park district. The trial court dismissed the
action due to the district's immunity. The plaintiff appealed,
challenging the constitutionality of the 1959 legislation. The
supreme court overturned, holding that the 1959 act violated the
state constitution's prohibition against local or special laws
because some local governments received immunity while others,
27
who were performing identical functions, did not. Pointing to the
statute's classification by agency, the court concluded that "in this
pattern there is no discernible relationship to the realities of life."'
On the other hand, the court was careful to point out that it
was not invalidating all legislative differentiation, but only
classifications based on the type of agency, not the governmental
function performed:
From this decision it does not follow that no valid classifications for
purposes of municipal tort liability are possible. On the contrary it
is feasible, and it may be thought desirable, to classify in terms of
20. Id. at 94.
21. Id. at 96.
Laws 782, 1890, 1954, 2020, 2060; Molitor, 163 N.E.2d at 10422. 1959 Ill.
05 (Davis, J., dissenting); Illinois Tort ClaimsAct, supra note 17, at 266 n.7.
23. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 34 § 301.1 (1959). Excerpted from Comment:
Governmental Immunity in Illinois: The Molitor Decision and the Legislative
Reaction, 54 NW. U. L. REV. 588, 598 n.52 (1959) [hereinafter Governmental
Immunity in Ilinois].
24. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122 §§ 821-31 (1959).
25. GovernmentalImmunity in Illinois, supra note 23, at 595.
1964).
26. 203 N.E.2d 573 (Ill.
27. Id. at 576-77; ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 22 (1870), (now Art. IV, § 13 (1970));
Illinois Tort ClaimsAct, supra note 17, at 272.
28. Harvey, 203 N.E.2d at 577.
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types of municipal function, instead of classifying among different
governmental agencies that perform the same function. 29
The general assembly re-crafted the invalidated 1959
legislation in 1965.
The legislature assumed a priori total
municipal liability and structured a set of immunities classified by
government function.3 0 The 1965 legislation extending immunity
to property used for recreational purposes drew on the Harvey
decision, and carefully used functional, not organizational,
criteria:
Neither a local public entity nor a public employee is liable for an
injury where the liability is based on the existence of a condition of
any public property intended or permitted to be used as a park,
playground or open area, unless such local entity or public employee
is guilty
of willful and wanton negligence proximately causing such
3
injury. 1
The phrase "intended or permitted" qualifies "public property"
by making public access to a given facility a precondition of
immunity. In addition, the local government must maintain the
facility in a manner consistent with ordinary recreational use. In
1972, the Illinois Supreme Court commented that section 3-106
"comes into operation only where liability... [is] predicated
upon
the existence of a condition of public property maintained by it and
intended or permitted to be used as a park, playground or open
area for recreational purposes."" Both the language of the statute
and its judicial interpretation point towards the conclusion that
"intended or permitted" was meant to relate to places, not people
(users) or types of use.
The phrase "intended or permitted"
apparently includes both places specifically prepared for
recreational use and those where recreational use is customary or
traditional.
A problem with this interpretation is that the grant of
immunity closely parallels the common "ordinary reasonable care"
standard in tort liability.
For example, if a municipality
maintains a playground in a manner reasonable given its
foreseeable uses, it is meeting its ordinary duty of reasonable care
29. Id.
30. Illinois Tort Claims Act, supra note 17, at 280.
31. 1965 Ill. Laws 2983, § 3-106 (emphasis added). The statute was
amended slightly in 1986, and now reads:
Neither a local public entity nor a public employee is liable for an injury
where the liability is based on the existence of a condition of any public
property intended or permitted to be used for recreational purposes,
including but not limited to parks, playgrounds, open areas, buildings or
other enclosed recreational facilities, unless such local entity or public
employee is guilty of willful and wanton conduct proximately causing
such injury.
745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/3-106.
32. Sullivan v. Midlothian Park Dist., 281 N.E.2d 659, 662 (Ill.
1972).
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and it qualifies for the state's affirmative defense of immunity.
This later caused Illinois courts to blur the distinction between
duty-an element of the plaintiffs claim-and immunity-an
affirmative defense.
The $10,000 cap on liability granted to school districts in 1959
also contained its own constitutional vulnerability. In Molitor, the
Illinois Supreme Court noted that the Kaneland School District
33
had taken advantage of a provision in state statutes permitting it
to purchase liability insurance for its school bus service." The
same statute required any school district purchasing such
5
of that coverage .
insurance to waive its immunity to the extent
This troubled the court:
Thus, under this statute, a person injured by an insured school
district bus may recover to the extent of such insurance, whereas...
a person injured by an uninsured school district bus can recover
nothing at all.... The difficulty with this legislative effort... is
that it allows each school district to determine for itself whether, and
responsible for the wrongs
to what extent,
36 it will be financially
inflicted by it.
The court suggests, in a foreshadowing of the Harvey case five
years later, that allowing school districts to select their ovn level
of immunity through the purchase of bus insurance made the
immunity statute an unconstitutional special law under Article IV,
However, because the
section 22 of the Illinois Constitution.
of whether the
question
larger
Molitor court chose to focus on the
to draw a firm
it
failed
permissible,
very concept of immunity was
point.
conclusion on this
When the Illinois legislature re-wrote the Illinois Tort Claims
Act in 1965 after the Harvey decision, the $10,000 liability cap for
school districts was retained,' but districts were now permitted to
9
purchase any type of liability insurance, not just bus insurance.
0
The requirement to waive immunity was similarly expanded.
The Molitor court's concern with the insurance waiver proved
prescient. In a 1966 case, Lorton v. Brown County Community
School District No. 1, 4 1 the state supreme court held that a sixmonth pre-notice requirement imposed on any plaintiff seeking a
waiver of immunity for the purpose of filing an insurance claim

33. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 122, § 29-11(a) (1957) (repealed).
34. 163 N.E.2d at 92.
35. Id.
36. Id. (emphasis added).
37. Now ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 13 (1970).
38. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 122, § 825 (1965).
39. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 85, § 9-103 (1965).
40. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 85, § 9-103(b) (1965) (repealed 1986).
1966).
41. 220 N.E.2d 161 (Ill.
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violated the special law provision of the state constitution.42 Two
years later, the state supreme court invalidated the $10,000 cap as
a special law without explaining the basis for its decision beyond
references to Harvey and Lorton.' By 1973, the constitutionality
of the immunity-insurance waiver was being openly debated," and
the General Assembly finally put the issue to rest in 1986 by
rewriting the statute to allow insurance carriers to assert all the
immunities held by their public sector clients.45
Given the concern over maintaining the constitutionality of
the 1965 legislation granting immunity to park districts and
schools, the "intended or permitted" language within the "property
used for recreational purposes" subsection of the Illinois Tort
Claims Act was a reasonable legislative response to a judicial
problem. Blocked by the special laws provision of the state
constitution from specifying particular types of governmental
entities, the legislature
used a permissible functional
differentiation.
Any governmental entity that permitted or
intended the public to use its grounds or equipment for
recreational purposes would fall within the purview of section 3106.
However, the same language wound up being inserted in the
general "care in maintenance" provision (section 3-102(a)) of the
Act:
Except as otherwise provided in this Article, a local public entity has
the duty to exercise ordinary care to maintain its property in a
reasonably safe condition for the use in the exercise of ordinary care
of people whom the entity intended and permitted to use the
property in a manner in which and at such times as it was
reasonably foreseeable that it would be used ....
Unfortunately, no legislative history exists for section 3102(a),47 so it is impossible to determine exactly how the "intended
and permitted" language was transferred over from section 3-106.
The transferred language was different in four important respects.
First, where section 3-106 granted immunity if certain conditions
were met, section 3-102(a) specified a duty of care. Second, the
phrase "intended or permitted" was changed to "intended and
42. Id. at 162-63; Ill.
Rev. Stat. ch. 122, § 823 (1963).
43. Treece v. Shawnee Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist., 233 N.E.2d 549, 554 (Ill.
1968).
44. Commentary: The Constitutionality of Section 9-103 of the Local
Government and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act, 50 CH.-KENT
L. REV. 137, 138-39 (1973).
45. 1996 Public Acts 84-1431; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 2; 745 ILL. COMP. STAT.
10/9-103(c) (2004).
46. Ill.
Rev. Stat. ch. 85, § 3-102(a) (1965) (current version at 745 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 10/3-102(a)) (emphasis added).
47. Gabriel v. City of Edwardsville, 604 N.E.2d 565, 574 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1992)
(Chapman, J., dissenting).
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permitted." Third, "intended and permitted" was used to modify
"people," not "public property." Fourth, "intended and permitted"
was followed by the qualifier that the property must be used in a
"reasonably foreseeable" manner.
At the time the ITLA was adopted in 1965, commentators
assumed that the "duty" language of section 3-102(a) was meant to
be read in conjunction with the grant of immunity in section 3However, section 3-106 only applied to recreational
106.'
facilities, while the language of section 3-102(a) made it applicable
to all public facilities. The following section, 3-103, served as a
bridge, extending immunity to general-purpose facilities:
A local public entity is not liable under this Article for an injury
caused by the adoption of a plan or design of a construction of, or an
The local entity is liable,
improvement to public property ....
however, if after the execution of such plan or design it appears from
49
its use that it has created a condition that it is not reasonably safe.
The fit between the sections was far from perfect, and the
potential always existed that a non-recreational facility
adequately maintained under the section 3-102(a) duty of care
might not fall under section 3-103's umbrella of immunity. In
1983, the Illinois Supreme Court dealt with the problem by
declaring that section 3-103's duty of care derived from a more
°
basic duty within section 3-102, and that section 3-102(a) was a
51
limit on liability as well as a specification of duty. This closed the
seam between sections 3-102 and 3-103, but further muddied the
water as to whether the former should be considered an element in
the cause of action or an affirmative defense.
The change from "intended or permitted" to "intended and
permitted" turned out to be the most insidious alteration,
especially when the object of this modifier was shifted from places
to people. The qualifier permitted by itself is straightforward:
permitted people are those with permission to use a facility,
presumably those with express permission (licensees) and those
whom the municipality has tacitly permitted through assent and
But when permitted is combined with
custom (invitees). 2
Is intended more
intended, the result is a logical muddle.
restrictive than permitted? Normally, to intend to do something

48. Illinois Tort Claims Act, supra note 17, at 286.
49. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 83, § 3-103(a) (current version at 745 ILL. COMP. STAT.
10/3-103(a)).
50. Curtis v. County of Cook, 456 N.E.2d 116, 120 (Ill. 1983).
51. Id. at 119. "The [ITLA] is in derogation of the common law action
against governmental entities and specifies certain limitations on the
liabilities of such bodies. One of these limitations appears in section 3102(a) .... " Id. (internal citations omitted).
52. See "invitee" and "licensee" in BRYAN A. GARDINER, A DICTIONARY OF
MODERN LEGAL USAGE 486, 528 (1995).
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evinces more purpose than merely permitting something to
happen. But permission to use property is very specific-it is
difficult to imagine giving express permission to someone to use a
site without intending to do so. The only reasonable interpretation
is that permitted includes both those with express permission
(licensees) and implied permission (invitees), while intended
excludes invitees, leaving only licensees.
Further exacerbating the problem is the inclusion of
"reasonably foreseeable manner" immediately after "intended
and
permitted." Does "foreseeable" re-open the category of relevant
people to include those who are merely permitted? An invitee,
after all, usually has implied permission through passive assent or
custom, and would reasonably be considered a foreseeable user.
The inclusion of both "in a manner" and "at such time" suggests
that a municipality has a duty to provide reasonable care to any
person engaging in a reasonable activity at a reasonable time. But
if the foreseeability language is meant to be confined strictly to
uses, not users, then the duty of care extends only to those with
explicit permission only so long as they are engaged in a
foreseeable activity.
Using the most extreme interpretation of sections 3-102(a)
and 3-103 together, a municipality would be immune from liability
unless: 1) a location was unreasonably unsafe; and 2) the user had
express permission to use the location; and 3) the user was
engaged in a foreseeable activity.
This was, in fact, the
interpretation that jelled in Boub 11. Between 1965 and 1998,
however, lay a long and contorted legal road.
B. Redefining Government Negligence: JudicialInterpretationof
the ITLA
Until 1986, it was settled law that the Tort Immunity Act
"essentially continued the common law duties of a municipality
with respect to the maintenance of its public ways. " ' The common
law in Illinois regarding the standard of due care to be accorded to
cyclists was established in a 1909 Illinois Supreme Court case,
Molway v. City of Chicago.' Some local courts had previously
ruled that absent a statutory provision, a bicyclist must "take the
road as he finds it."' While finding that "the law does not require
a road shall be absolutely safe for bicycling purposes, " 56 the court
added that "public officials are bound to take into consideration
the probability that it will be used by all vehicles that are in
53. Risner v. City of Chicago, 502 N.E.2d 357, 359 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1986)
(quoting Larson v. City of Chicago, 491 N.E.2d 165, 166 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1986).
Accord Santelli v. City of Chicago, 584 N.E.2d 456, 459 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1991).
54. 88 N.E. 485, 487 (Ill.
1909).
55. Id. at 486.
56. Id. at 487.
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make it reasonably safe and
common use and they must
57
convenient for all such uses."
Despite the heavy reliance the plaintiff and amici in Boub II
would place on Molway, the core of its decision was simply that
bicyclists were ordinary users: "Some authorities apparently
assume that to make the highways or streets reasonably safe for
bicyclists using reasonable care would impose more onerous duties
upon municipalities than to keep them in repair for pedestrians or
horse-drawn vehicles. We do not think that this conclusion...
necessarily follows."'
As ordinary users, bicyclists were foreseeable and thus were
owed a duty of ordinary reasonable care. Overlooked in the
pedestrian cases argued almost a century later was the apparently
obvious finding that "reasonably safe condition for travel in the
ordinary modes"59 was a practical question, to be determined in
That is, while the
each case by the particular circumstances.'
issue of whether a bicyclist was a reasonable user was a question
of law, reasonable use by the cyclist and reasonable ordinary care
by the municipality were questions of fact to be determined in each
case.9" This would eventually become a critical, but unrecognized,
issue. Molway's foreseeability test was made more explicit two
years later in Boender v. City of Harvey: "The object to be secured
is reasonable safety for travel, considering the amount and kind of
may fairly be expected upon the particular road or
travel which
62
street."
A seemingly unrelated case some fifty years later started to
The City of Chicago was
erode the permanence of Molway.'
repairing a through street (an arterial) and detoured traffic
through two local streets. A local ordinance required the city's
traffic engineer to protect the right-of-way of all through streets by
placing stop signs facing the intersecting roads. The detour's
right-of-way was not so protected, and driver Locigno entered the
He was
detour route from a side street without stopping.
broadsided and his two children were killed.' Mr. Locigno sued
the city, claiming it had a duty to give the detour the same rightof-way protection as a through street.
The court held that the detour was not a through route
because it had not been designated through the installation of
57. Id.
58. Id. at 486.
59. Id. at 487.
60. Id.
61. "No rigid rule can be laid down as to defects in highways or streets for
which municipalities will be liable or as to the degree of care required by the
person injured." Id..
1911).
62. 95 N.E. 1084, 1085 (Ill.
63. Locigno v. City of Chicago, 178 N.E.2d 124 (Ill. App. Ct. 1961).
64. Id. at 126.
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signage." "A street does not become a through street because it is
used as a through street," said the court, "it becomes a through
street because it is so designated and appropriatesigns placed."6
While Molway held that the reasonable use of a street could
be determined from the circumstances of its actual use, Locigno
transferred much of this power from roadway users and court factfinders to the local government.
It also extended Boender's
"localness" criteria down to specific streets and gave municipalities
the authority to differentiate between roadways through the use of
signage and road markings.
The first test of section 3-102's "intended and permitted"
language came in a 1973 case, Deren v. City of Carbondale." Mr.
Deren, a pedestrian, was struck while walking on the edge of
South Wall Street. Although South Wall had no sidewalk, it was
used regularly by students walking to a nearby university.' Mr.
Deren framed the issue as one of foreseeability: "Does a city,
possessed of knowledge of regular and heavy pedestrian use...
have a duty by reason of its knowledge to take reasonable
precautions to safeguard such pedestrians from injury by
vehicles?" 9
The appeals court said no, because it was intent, not
foreseeability, that mattered: "a city is only required to maintain
the respective portions of its streets in reasonably safe condition
for the purposes to which they are respectively devoted by the
intention and sanction of the city.""
But in reaching this conclusion, the court faced formidable
interpretive hurdles. The "intended and permitted" language of
the ITLA is situated within section 3-102, which deals with a duty
of care to maintain facilities. However, in this case, the problem
was not maintenance, but a failure to install a vitally needed
sidewalk. That situation is addressed in section 3-103, but its
language is limited to immunity from liability, not duty of care.
The trial court dismissed Mr. Deren's complaint for failure to
state a claim.7' If the appellate court determined that there was a
disputed issue of fact, dismissal would be unwarranted. The
determination as to whether the city had a duty of care was an
issue of law, but the existence of immunity was a question of fact.
The appellate court couldn't rest its decision on section 3-103,
because that would mean a remand back to the trial level, but it
couldn't base the decision on section 3-102 either, because
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 128.
Id. (emphasis added).
300 N.E.2d 590, 592 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1973).
Id. at 591.
Id.
Id. at 593.
Id. at 591.
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installation, not maintenance, was the issue.
So the appeals court solved the problem by conflating section
3-102's intent and duty of care language into section 3-103's
immunity provisions:
Long established principles of law fix the rights and liabilities of the
parties in a case of this sort... the responsibility of public entities
has only been extended to those undertakings which they choose or
elect to carry out. We are not prepared to create a general duty
upon municipalities for the safeguarding of pedestrians.
72
Thus, intent applied to both the provision of facilities and
their maintenance. More importantly, both were questions of duty
to be determined by the court.
Intent/foreseeability,
maintenance/adequate provision, and immunity/duty of care
became inseparable issues.
While foreseeability became defined as the reasonable
recognition of existing problems that the city had to address to
meet its duty of care, intent became a policy decision that the city
had the power to make. Duty became tautological: A city had no
duty of care if it intended no duty of care. The court apparently
recognized what it had done, because it rationalized away the
implications of its handiwork by asserting that "a municipality has
never been intended under our system as a principal source of
social protection."73
The court wasn't yet finished with Mr. Deren. Using a
blatant misreading of a 1909 Illinois Supreme Court case,
VanCleef v. City -of Chicago,74 the court in Deren came to the
remarkably circular conclusion that "the liability of a municipality
with respect to its public streets is limited to their use as streets."
Applying the language from Locigno that a through street is not a
through street until it is designated and signed,"5 the Deren court
shifted the second half of the tautology to assert that the liability
of a municipality with respect to its public streets is limited to
their use as vehicular ways. Unless designated and signed to the
contrary, the streets were for motor vehicles. 6
72. Id. at 593.
73. Id.
74. 88 N.E. 815 (Ill. 1909). The Deren court used the following quote, to

which I have re-inserted the original following sentence, in italics:
Undoubtedly, under ordinary circumstances it is the duty of a city to see
that its streets are reasonably safe for the uses for which streets are
intended. The liability of the city is, of course, not confined to travelers,
but extends to a person stopping on the street to converse with another,or
stopping to see a procession pass, or using the street for convenience or
pleasure.
Id. at 817 (emphasis added).

75. 178 N.E.2d at 128.
76. Deren, 300 N.E.2d at 593. The validity of this assertion was challenged
two years later, on federal constitutional grounds, in Bykofsky v. Borough of
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In a lengthy dissent, Justice Moran identified and rebutted
each point: 1) the majority's opinion was predicated on a naked
assertion that streets were built solely for vehicular traffic; 2) the
issue of intent should not be subordinated to a question of duty,
but was a separate fact-based determination; and 3) intent was not
the same as foreseeability, and the two should not be confused.77
Justice Moran also implied that a use could be so foreseeable that
it would override intent:
The control of the streets of cities was not put into their
[municipalities'] hands for the purpose that they might plan or order
that the streets should be made dangerous or unsafe for the public
to travel thereon.... Such action would be substantially the same
as planning and creating a public nuisance. 8
Many of these issues were addressed by the state supreme
court in 1983 in Curtis v. County of Cook 7 ' a drag-racing case. The
plaintiff was a passenger injured when her car went off the road
and hit a traffic sign.8" Looking to the "intended and permitted"
clause in section 3-102, the court decided that "the language
evinces a legislative intent to extend a duty of care only to those
persons by whom the local government intended the property to be
used,"8' and that "the existence of a duty must be determined by
the courts as a matter of law." 2 Because Ms. Curtis was not an
intended user, one of the elements in the cause of action (duty)
was not met.' The holding in Curtis would have two significant
impacts on the pedestrian cases and in Boub H.
First, intent firmly became an element of duty, and a question
of law for the court to determine. Second, intent defined categories
of users, not types of use. A particular user could be acting
responsibly, exercising more than ordinary care, and still not be an
intended user. On the other hand, intention was subsumed within
a municipality's duty of care and was pulled out of the affirmative
defense of immunity. Or it could be situated in both. At best, this
meant that a municipality could assert immunity without having
Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242, 1254 (M.D. Penn. 1975), affd, 535 F.2d 1245
(3d Cir. 1976): "One may be on the streets even though he is there merely for

exercise, recreation, walking, standing, talking, socializing, or any other
purpose that does not interfere with other persons' rights." Bykofsky is
discussed in greater detail in the following section of this Article.
77. Deren, 300 N.E.2d at 595 (Moran, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 595 (Moran, J., dissenting) (quoting Gould v. Topeka, 4 P. 822,
826-27 (Kan. 1884)).

79.
80.
81.
82.

456 N.E.2d at 116.
Id. at 118.
Id. at 120.
Id. at 119.
83. Id. at 120. "As a passenger in a speed-clocking automobile, Deborah
Curtis cannot be said to fall within the class of motorists by whom the
defendant's highways were intended to be used." Id. (emphasis added).
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to admit it had a duty of care. Alternatively, it could get two bites
at the apple, once in determining duty-a question of law-and
again in asserting immunity-an issue of fact. At worst, it meant
that a municipality could define its own duty of care by creating
categories of intended users, treating all unintended users as
unforeseeable, regardless of whether they should be reasonably
anticipated or whether their use adhered to regulations and
standards of conduct.
These ambiguities cascaded down through the Illinois court
system. For example, Risner v. City of Chicago,' decided three
years later, would become a seminal ITLA case. Plaintiff Howard
Risner exited an eastbound Chicago Transit bus on Adams Street
and walked across the street in mid-block. Adams was a one-way
westbound street, but busses were allowed to travel in the opposite
direction. Mr. Risner failed to look in the proper direction and was
struck by a westbound car.'
The Risner court did try to clarify one issue: that immunity
under the ITLA is a question of duty-an issue of law. It was not
entirely successful, concluding that while issues of foreseeability
and breach are questions of fact and duty is a matter of law,'
immunity is synonymous with the existence of duty. 7
The appeals court held that the city had no duty to Mr.
Risner, but explained its holding in three diametrically opposed
sentences:
Here, however, plaintiff was not an intended or permitted user of
defendant's street, using it in a manner it was reasonably
foreseeable it would be used; the street is for use by vehicular
traffic-not pedestrians, except where defendant has provided
crosswalks or the like. In addition, although plaintiff argues that
foreseeability is the measure of liability in determining the
reasonable care to be exercised by the municipality, that
foreseeability, pursuant to the language of the [ITLA], pertains to
use of the municipality's property, by permitted and intended users,
not to foreseeable users as plaintiff argues, "in a manner in which
and at such times as it was reasonably foreseeable it would be used."
Here, as mentioned above, Adams street is for the use of vehicular
traffic, and jaywalkers are not intended or permitted users and not,
therefore, users making use of the street in a foreseeable manner.88
These sentences are so self-deconstructing that one has to
wonder if the obscuration was deliberate. Start with the first

84.
85.
86.
87.

502 N.E.2d 357 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
Id. at 358.
Id. at 359.
Id. "A municipality is not an insurer of the safety of pedestrians
against all accidents occurring on its property; its duty/liability is governed by
the [ITLA]." Id. (emphasis added).
88. Id. at 359-60.
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sentence. The placement of the comma between "street" and
"using," without a functional connective, leaves the reader unable
to tell if the court thought Mr. Risner was an unintended user
using the street in a foreseeable manner, or an unintended user
using the street in an unforeseeable manner.
The second
sentence, prior to the second comma, makes clear that the plaintiff
was arguing that foreseeability should determine liability. After
the comma, the sentence continues with "that foreseeability,"
presumably both the foreseeability that the plaintiff refers to and
the "reasonably foreseeable" language in section 3-102. This dual
reference is supported by the "pursuant to the language of the
[ITLA]" phrase. Thus, the remainder of the second sentence
apparently concludes with the determination that "permitted and
intended" refers to categories of people, and "foreseeable" refers to
the manner of use by those people. The second sentence is
followed by a see also citation to Curtis, further supporting this
interpretation.
But if one accepts this interpretation, the third sentence
becomes contradictory.
The second sentence concludes that
"intended" classifies users, and "foreseeable" categorizes manner of
use. But the third sentence then asserts that unintended users
are inherently unforeseeable, regardless of their actual conduct,
simply because they are unintended. Furthermore, because the
existence of duty is a matter of law, and the existence of duty is
determined by intent, intent is an issue of law.
But if
foreseeability (an issue of fact) is a separate cross-cutting
categorization from intention, a determination of status as
intended or unintended still requires the fact-finder to decide if the
use was foreseeable or unforeseeable. The distinction is not
trivial, for the issue of fact (foreseeability) is an element of the
complaint, while the issue of law (intention) is limited to the
application of the affirmative defense of immunity.
The Risner court's ambiguity permitted it to reduce the case
to a single issue of law by subsuming foreseeability under intent.
In effect, the court determined that all unintended users are
unforeseeable users, thereby converting classes of people into
classes of acts, and making both a single issue of law. The only
determinative element remaining was whether a defendant could
convince the court that a user was unintended, and could argue
this twice: as a failure to state a cause of action (because no duty
existed) or in summary judgment as a lack of dispute as to a
material issue (because the plaintiff belonged to a category of
users from which the municipality was immune).
Not every district of the Illinois appeals court elected to follow
the first district. The Third District came to a very different
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9
Mr. Di
conclusion in a 1988 case, Di Domenico v. Romeoville."
Domenico was legally parked in the street parallel to the curb.
When he walked out into the road to enter his car, he tripped over
a pothole and was injured. The trial court dismissed for failure to
state a cause of action." The appeals court overturned, holding
that because the village permitted curbside parking, it must have
recognized the need to walk in the street to access parked cars.91
"It defies common sense," stated the court, "to conclude that such
local entities did not contemplate and intend" that drivers "would
use the street area around parked cars for ingress and egress. " '
The court rejected the village's appeal to Deren and Risner,
deciding that "they provide factual situations quite dissimilar to
that presented in the case being considered."93
Notice the court's use of the phrase "contemplate and intend."
The Third District apparently rejected the earlier attempts to
create a dichotomy of intention and foreseeability and sent a brief,
but unambiguous, statement that it intended to rely on
foreseeability, a question of fact, to assess the prima facie validity
of a cause of action. 94
The Illinois Supreme Court did little to clarify the matter
when it heard another pedestrian case, Marshall v. City of
Centralia,95 in 1991, three years after Di Domenico. A child
walking on a sidewalk within the right-of-way of a parkway left
the sidewalk to avoid a mud puddle and fell into an open
The court made no meaningful distinction between
manhole.'
"duty of care" and "limitation on liability," treating them
interchangeably. The court clearly stated that duty of care is a
question of law to be determined by the court, 97 and determining
intent is a part of this analysis.99 But it decided that "intent, being
a mental state, can rarely be discerned from direct proof and must
ordinarily be inferred from the facts."' The court concluded that
intent was a question of law that must be determined by the facts!
The court also obscured the distinction between intended
users and intended uses, as well as the closely linked question of

89. 525 N.E.2d 242 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
90. Id. at 242-43.
91. Id. at 243.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 244.
94. Because the question at bar was the failure to state a valid claim,
immunity was never an issue.
95. 570 N.E.2d 315 (Ill. 1991).
96. Id. at 317.
97. Id. at 319.
98. "Whether the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty requires this court to
refer to the language of section 3-102(a)... and determine whether the
parkway was for the intended use of the plaintiff." Id.
99. Id.
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whether intent is the same as foreseeability. In the analysis of
whether intent was an issue of law or fact, the court framed the
issue as a determination of "whether the parkway was for the
intended use of the plaintiff,""° and concluded that "the defendant
had a duty to exercise ordinary care to maintain the parkway in a
reasonably safe condition for the benefit of the plaintiff."'°
Continuing on, however, the court held that cities cannot
maintain unreasonable conditions "at places where people may
reasonably be expected to go," and that municipalities "must take
into account the natural inclination of children to run about in
play and the perverse insistence of adults to cut corners and cross
streets and grass plats instead of following precisely the beaten or
provided path.""°
As examples, the court cited a wide variety of reasonable
parkway activities: "to enter a car that is parked at the curb; to
retrieve mail from a mailbox; to reach a neighbor's house across
the street; to board a bus; to stand so that others can pass you on
the sidewalk; to cut the lawn ...and to rake the leaves.""° The
thread that combined these disparate activities was that they were
"commonly associated" with the facility through historic use."
The state supreme court never clarified whether this "historically
used" test defined users, as suggested by its analogy with the
traditional invitee definition, or uses, a measure of foreseeability,
as the addition of "commonly associated" to the test suggests.
A few months after Marshall, the Illinois Appellate Court,
First District, heard Santelli v. City of Chicago."5 Mr. Santelli and
his passenger were killed when their car lost control in a newly
rebuilt curve in a roadway. The plaintiff estate asserted that
section 11-304 of the Illinois Motor Vehicle Code required cities to
post traffic control devices that "conform to the State Manual and
Specifications and [are] justified by traffic warrants stated in the
Manual.""°6 The appeals court upheld dismissal under section 3104 of the Tort Immunity Act, which immunized local
governments from failure to provide traffic control devices."'
Although the case did not concern section 3-102(a), it did establish
the precedent that the immunity of the Tort Immunity Act
included the breach of a duty specifically imposed by the state
itself.10 8

100.
101.
102.
103.

Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.

104. Id.
105. 584 N.E.2d 456 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1991).
106. Id. at 460. See also Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 95 1/2, § 11-304 (1987).
107. Ill.
Rev. Stat. ch. 85, § 3-104 (1987).
108. Santelli, 584 N.E.2d at 460-61.
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The Illinois Supreme Court revisited the pedestrian issue a
year after Marshall. Eugene Wojdyla was killed at night walking
across a six-lane highway that separated his employer's business
and the firm's parking lot. The street lighting was poor and the
°
nearest crosswalks were a half-mile in each direction."
to Curtis
back
The court veered sharply away from Marshall,
and Deren, but like most retreats, Wojdyla was messy and chaotic.
Marshall, the court claimed, was distinguishable because the
location of the earlier incident, a parkway, created a "situation of
110
There, the
conflicting purposes on municipal property."
pedestrian was an intended user "because his use of the parkway
was a customary one." On the other hand, "[hiere, the purpose of
the highway is clearly for the use of automobiles"' because "[tihe
lines in the street and the signs by the road are intended for use
by vehicular traffic." This was the "designated, signed and
marked" test from Locigno, but combined with a Marshall-like
"customary usage" test.
But the syllogism of "customary use, therefore intended user"
appeared to give new life to Molway, the 1909 bicycle case. This
interpretation contradicted the supreme court's own recent holding
in Curtis that intention designated users (not uses), which
threatened to broaden the Di Domenici "intention by implication"
argument, and imperil the usefulness of Deren. The court started
with Molway, which it killed with kindness. The court asserted
that its "historical perspective still holds true""' because "the
developer of modem highways now creates the design for the
benefit of automobiles and other vehicles, and rarely for
pedestrians."" 3 Although "[in the most primitive state of society
the conception of a highway was merely a foot-path," given the
"growth of civilization" the purpose of roads had evolved "until
today our urban highways are devoted to a variety of uses not
4
The
known in former times and [was] never dreamed of.""
conclusion that followed this analysis in Molway was conveniently
forgotten: "To hold that the standard of safety required of public
authorities as to streets and highways for all methods of travel
should be the safety required for a horse drawn carriage, or of any
vehicle, would not accord with wise public
other particular
15
policy."1
The irony in this holding became apparent in Boub II when
the supreme court emphasized that the categorization of users into
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Wojdyla v. City of Park Ridge, 592 N.E.2d 1098, 1099-1100 (IlM. 1992).
Id. at 1101.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
88 N.E. at 486 (emphasis added).
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"permitted" and "intended and permitted" was an immunity/duty
of care issue, not a question of transportation policy. The Boub II
court claimed that there was no contradiction created by the State
of Illinois promoting bicycle use at the same time that Wayne
Township was denying they were intended users; the former was
state transportation policy, the later was state immunity policy."'
The holding in Wojdyla that "customary use" had to yield to the
destiny of the automobile was an undisguised public policy
decision, and veered perilously close to judicial legislating.
The Wojdyla court had more of a problem when it next turned
to Di Domenico. There, the pedestrian was walking to his parallelparked car, but was still in the roadway. The city argued that
parking lanes and travel lanes were not the same, and Mr. Di
Domenico countered that such fine-grained spatial distinctions
were useless, and that it was the user's purpose that mattered.117
The Wojdyla court sharply disagreed:
Were we to measure the duty of care by the intent of individuals
traveling over these various properties, we would effectively negate
section 3-102(a) .... for no longer would the intended use by the
municipality be controlling. Instead, the intent of any particular
individual would determine whether the municipality owed a duty
of care." 8
This is the earliest clear articulation of the "localization"
doctrine that was hinted at in Santelli: the intent of the local
government controls, and is more important than the intent of the
user or the intent of higher levels of government. This left one
glaring gap in the finding: if the difference of only a few feet could
determine the local government intent, how was one to know if he
or she was intended? To resolve this, the supreme court again
reached back to Locigno, although it never cited the case:
To determine the intended use of property involved here, we need
look no further than the property itself. The roads are paved,
marked and regulated by traffic signs and signals.... Parking
lanes are set out according to painted blocks on the pavement, signs
or meters....
Pedestrian walkways are designated by painted
crosswalks by design, and by intersections by custom. These are the
116. 702 N.E.2d at 540. "Under... the Tort Immunity Act, it is the intent of
the local public entity that controls; accordingly, the intent of another public
body, whether it is the state, a county, or other local entity, should be
irrelevant." Id.
117. Woidyla, 592 N.E.2d at 1102.
Plaintiff asserts the location of the decedent at the time of his injury is
irrelevant to our inquiry of whether the defendants owed a duty of care,
and the key factor to be considered is the purpose in which he was
engaged, in this case the approach to his legally parked car.
Id. In both Di Domenico and Wojdyla the injured party was walking to a car
parked at the edge of the roadway.
118. Id.
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indications of intended use. n9
This became the second half of the localization doctrine:
intended users are to be designated by signs or markings or other
physical objects-what the court would later call "clear
Foreseeability was again
of intent. " 12
manifestations
estate asked the court "to
Wojdyla's
Mr.
subordinated to intent.
streetlights, it must
erects
a
municipality
mandate that whenever
use the
foreseeably
may
who
all
for
lighting
provide adequate
21
of the
merits
the
consider
to
refused
The court
street."
decedent
the
determined
have
we
"since
argument, stating that
122
This was
was not an intended user, this argument must fail."
permitted,
a
that
court
supreme
the
by
the clearest statement yet
but not intended, user could never be acting in a foreseeable
manner.
Less than a year later, the Illinois Appellate Court heard yet
another pedestrian case. The outcome was a straightforward
application of Wojdyla. But in a dissent over twice as long as the
majority opinion, Justice Chapman reviewed virtually the entire
history of section 3-102 litigation starting with Curtis in 1983.122
He focused on two issues: the conflation of duty of care and
immunity, and the confusion between intent and foreseeability.
Justice Chapman cautioned his colleagues that "the duty question
should not be based on whether the plaintiff is getting out of a
lawfully parked car, or crossing a street within a crosswalk, or any
other exception or limitation. " 124 The duty imposed under common
law to provide facilities that are in reasonably safe condition
should be retained, he argued, and the recent tendency to
distinguish very finely between types of property should be
abandoned.'25 Location and physical characteristics should be left
to a fact-specific evaluation of the breach of duty. After all, he
asked, could anyone argue that a city "would not have a duty to...
do something about a 10-foot wide pit filled with crocodiles,
whether that pit was in a sidewalk, on the parkway beside the
2
sidewalk, or in the middle of a street?" ' The answer would soon
surprise him.
Justice Chapman then asked why section 3-102(a) provided
He
for both "intended" and "reasonably foreseeable" users.
conjectured that the "logical purpose" of the apparently duplicative
language "would have been to differentiate between the common
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. at 102-03.
Sisk v. Williamson County, 657 N.E.2d 903, 907 (Ill. 1995).
Wojdyla, 592 N.E.2d at 1103.
Id. at 1103-04.
Gabriel,604 N.E.2d at 568-75 (Chapman, J., dissenting).
Id. at 573 (Chapman, J., dissenting).
Id. at 573-74 (Chapman, J., dissenting).
Id. at 573 (Chapman, J., dissenting).
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law classes of licensees, invitees, and trespassers which were still
recognized at the time of the passage of the Act."127 Some places,
such as streets and parks, are open to all, while others, such as
parking garages and offices, are only open to certain people.
Section 3-102(a) asked two separate questions: 1) is this person
intended and permitted; and 2) was this person acting in a
reasonably foreseeable manner? Justice Chapman pointed to
Risner, the Chicago bus passenger case, as the place where this
"logical" construction started to break down:
Who were the "people" in Risner? Presumably, he was a citizen of
Chicago. Did the city intend him to jaywalk? No. Did it permit
jaywalking? No. But does either of the latter two questions have
anything to do with whether a citizen of Chicago is "intended and
128
permitted to use the property," the public streets of the city? No.
Perhaps realizing that his argument would not become a bestseller, Justice Chapman ended his dissent with the puckish
comment that the majority reached a conclusion that "while it may
have been permitted, was not... intended by the legislature."2 9
The Illinois Supreme Court refined Wojdyla a year later in
Curatola v. Village of Niles. 3 ' The facts were similar to Di
Domenico: a truck driver legally parked at curbside was injured
when he stepped into a pothole. The Illinois Third District
Appellate Court affirmed summary judgment for the village,
concluding that Wojdyla invalidated Di Dominico. 3' The supreme
court overturned, reconciling the two cases by restricting Di
Domenico into insignificance. The court started with the nowfamiliar principle that the streets are "for use by vehicular
traffic-not
pedestrians,
except
under
certain
limited
circumstances. " 32
The court found only one qualifying
circumstance, Di Domenico, which it labeled a "narrow
exception." 1 3 However, the Curatola court acknowledged the
legitimacy of Di Domenico's holding that on-street parking implies
that pedestrians are intended roadway users because the parking
"mandates or requires pedestrians' usage of the
immediate
street."'3 The court then grafted on Locigno's "designation and
signage" test, as applied in Wojdyla. The combined test required
that an injured pedestrian must establish that: 1) his or her use of
the roadway was "mandated by or immediately proximate to" onstreet parking; and 2) that the parking have "clear indications
127.
(Chapman,
J., dissenting).
128. Id.
Id. at
at 574
576-77
(Chapman,
J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 575 (Chapman, J., dissenting).
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

608 N.E.2d 882 (Ill. 1993).
Id. at 882-83.
Id. at 886.
Id. at 888.
Id. at 887.
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regarding the property's intended use."136
The importance of Curatola, however, lay in its dicta. The
City of Chicago had filed an amicus curiae brief conceding that the
type of roadway pedestrians found in Risner, Di Domenico, and
Wojdyla were foreseeable. 3 ' However, because of "the enormity of
that burden" on cities posed by these uses, the City of Chicago
asked the court to use liability exposure as the benchmark for
establishing local intent. 137 If a given category of user had the
potential to generate significant liability, that fact alone should be
dispositive in determining that he or she was not an intended
user.
The court was almost apologetic in its denial of the request.
To soften the blow, it offered Chicago two concessions: it would do
what it could to keep Di Domenico-type exceptions narrow, and it
would permit "factual issues" relating to the existence of a duty of
9
care to be put before juries "upon proper instruction."" However,
the Chicago "burdensome, therefore unintended" formula would
not go quietly into the night. It returned three years later in
Vaughn v. City of West Frankfort,"'° another jaywalking case, this
time involving a pedestrian who crossed the street in mid-block
because the sidewalk ended on her side of the street. Di
Domenico's "necessary, therefore intended" exception took another
hit when the court found that "it was not impossible for plaintiff to
reach her destination without stepping into the street....,
"Necessary" was now replaced with "not impossible." The court
also rejected the appellate court's contention that the costs of
guarding against Ms. Vaughn's injury was not an undue burden on
West Frankfort. Pointing to the ITLA's "clear policy" to protect
municipalities from liability, the supreme court concluded that
"the costs of making all public streets and roadways reasonably
safe for unrestricted pedestrian use would be an extreme burden,"
and "decline[d] the invitation to impose liability on the City ... "'
The Chicago formula was working its way into Illinois common
law.
The Supreme Court of Illinois heard one final pedestrian case
before Boub II, Sisk v. Williamson County." The plaintiff was
driving at night down a quiet rural road when his car struck a
cement bridge abutment obscured by high weeds. When he
138

'

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id.
Id. at 885.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 888.
1995).
651 N.E.2d 1115 (Ill.

141. Id. at 1118.
142. Id. at 1119.
143. 657 N.E.2d 903 (Ill. 1995).
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walked around the car to check for damage, the same weeds hid
the edge of the road and he fell into the creek beneath.'"
The appellate court found that the county had a duty of care
to the plaintiff because the lack of sidewalks on a rural road make
it impossible to walk anywhere but the road, and that the
pedestrian use of quiet rural roads was "traditional and
customary."'45 Moreover, the Illinois Vehicle Code contained
specific instructions that a pedestrian on a highway without a
sidewalk or shoulder should walk on the left edge of the road.
Such regulation, reasoned the appellate court, was a legislative
direction that rural pedestrians at the edge of the road were
foreseeable."
The supreme court overturned. Invoking Deren and Locigno,
the court rejected the entire appellate court's "traditional and
customary" reasoning and even its own "impossibility" doctrine.
Falling back on Wojdyla's "intent must be inferred from the
circumstances" principle, the court found that only physical
"manifestations of intent," such as "signs, meters and pavement
markings" were

sufficient

to establish

intent.

7

Although

pedestrians on rural roads may be foreseeable, and sometimes
even inevitable, neither foreseeability nor necessity manifested
intent.'"
Moreover, only the intent of the local government mattered,
as "the Illinois legislature has established a clear public policy to
immunize government from the financial burden of preventing
4 9
injuries which occur as a result of unintended uses of roadways."

Although other state statutes, such as the vehicle code, may
regulate permitted uses, the legislative intent embodied in the
Tort Liability Act alone controlled intended uses.
The
"localization" doctrine of Locigno and Deren, and the Chicago
"intent as determined by risk" formula came together in Sisk. The
default rule was that streets are for motor vehicles. While the
state and regional governments could determine who was a
permitted user, only the most local unit of government could
decide who was intended. Such intent must be expressed in
physical manifestations, such as signage or roadway markings.
Intent defined classes of users, not uses, and was a threshold
determination in deciding both the issue of duty and the
affirmative defense of immunity-any unintended user was per se
144. Id. at 904.
145. Id. at 906.
146. Id. at 905-06.
147. Id. at 907.
148. Id. "Although it may become necessary at times for pedestrians to walk
on county roads, such use is not a manifestation of the local municipality's
intent." Id. (emphasis added).
149. Id. at 908.
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unforeseeable, regardless of the propriety of his or her use.
Because foreseeability went to the establishment of duty, it was a
question of law to be decided by the court, usually upon a motion
for summary judgment.
C. The Boub Case
Jon Boub's complaint contained six counts, three alleging
negligence and three alleging wanton and willful misconduct.
Wayne Township moved for summary judgment, which was
granted by the trial court. Mr. Boub appealed only the three
negligence counts.' ° In addition to an alleged failure to properly
maintain the bridge in accordance with section 3-102(a), the
plaintiff also maintained that the township failed to obtain prior
approval for the improvement project under section 3-103, and
that the township failed to properly post warning signs at a road
construction site as per section 3-104.152
Both sides agreed that the central issue was whether a cyclist
Noting that "we are not
is an intended user of the roadway.'
aware of any case that has definitively determined whether
bicyclists are intended users of the streets,"54 the appellate court
turned to the three pedestrian cases, Wojdyla, Vaughn, and Sisk."
Adopting the admonishment in Wojdyla that "a court should look
to the property itself to determine its intended use,"" the court
determined that its task was to "look for manifestations in or on
the subject property signifying that defendants intended that the
road... be used by bicyclists." 157 The court concluded that "our
review of the record did not reveal anything, based on the property
by defendants that bicyclists use
itself, that manifested an intent
158
the subject road and bridge."
In their amici brief to the state supreme court, the League of
Illinois Bicyclists and the Chicagoland Bicycle Federation
countered that the state vehicle code, the Illinois Department of
Transportation planning and design manuals, and the DuPage
County transportation plans evinced a policy to regard cyclists as
intended users of the roadway. 9 In addition, the friends of the
court argued that Molway, the 1909 case, was still relevant
M

150. Boub 1, 684 N.E.2d at 1042.
151. Id. at 1046-47.
152. Id. at 1047.
153. Id. at 1042-43.
154. Id. at 1044.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1045.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1046.
159. Brief of Amici Curiae League of Illinois Bicyclists at 28-29, Boub v.
Township of Wayne, 702 N.E.2d 535 (Ill. 1998) (No. 84246), availableat 1998
WL 34114740.
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because it established a common law doctrine uniquely targeted at
cyclists, one that had never been supplanted. 6 ° Mr. Boub had
previously raised this argument before the appeals court, which
rejected it, holding that such plans apply equally to both permitted
and intended users, so "the fact that such rules have been
established sheds no light on the issue before us."" 1 Similarly, the
appellate court also concluded that the supreme court's decisions
in Wojdyla and Sisk to "discard as outmoded" Molway applied
equally to all roadway users except motor vehicles. 6
Mr. Boub's briefs had to address a significant statute of
limitations issue, and thus the amici brief contained many of the
details of Mr. Boub's case-in-chief. Both reiterated the argument
that Mr. Boub was both an intended and permitted user because it
was the policy of the State of Illinois and DuPage County to
actively promote bicycling and improve conditions for bicyclists.6
In addition, Mr. Boub asserted that the trial court's literal
interpretation of Wojdyla, Vaughn, and Sisk that "a court should
look to the property itself to determine its intended use,"" led the
trial court to an unintended situation where it was
countermanding state statute and administrative policy. 5 This
was the result of analogizing pedestrian use to cycling, which "fails
to consider the particular and distinct facts" differentiating the
two. " In addition, the amici curiae argued that bicycle use was
"customary and traditional," a clear reference to Molway and the
muddled Wojdyla holding. 7
Given the state's judicial history of conflating foreseeability
(uses) and intent (users), this argument could have been used to
drive a wedge in Wayne Township's main argument that intention
was a form of permission local governments could extend or
withdraw from classes of users at its discretion." Instead, Mr.
Boub's counsel made the tactical error of admitting that both sides
160. Id. at 33.
161. Boub 1, 684 N.E.2d at 1046.
162. Id. at 1045.
163. Supplemental Brief of Appellant at 9, Boub H (No. 84246), availableat
1998 WL 34181974.

164. Boub 1, 684 N.E.2d at 1045.
165. Supplemental Brief of Appellant at 11, Boub H (No. 84246) availableat
1998 WL 34181974. 'Possibly the appellate court believed that when Sisk,
Vaughn, and Wojdyla required courts to look to the property itself, it required
them to ignore state statutes." Id.
166. Id. at 5.
167. Brief of Amici Curiae League of Illinois Bicyclists at 29-30, Boub H (No.
84246), availableat 1998 WL 34114740.
168. Brief of Defendants-Appellees Township of Wayne at 36, Boub II (No.

84246), available at 1998 WL 34181975.
[while... bicyclists may be
permitted users of the road-i.e., they are not affirmatively prohibited from
using the roadway-a local public entity's responsibility/duty.., is limited
only to intended and permitted users (namely, vehicular traffic)." Id.
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agreed that "there is a distinction between a mere permitted user
and a user who is intended and permitted."'69 Instead, counsel
should have argued that intent was a form of foreseeability, and
that it applied to both users and uses. Similarly, while plaintiffs
counsel and the amici argued that Marshallheld that intent was a
question of fact, they failed to connect this argument to the larger
issue of whether all unintentional users were, by definition,
unforeseeable, or whether the categories were cross-cutting, with
state and regional agencies determining which uses were
foreseeable, and local governments deciding which users were
intended.
The main thrust of both the plaintiff and amici briefs was a
fear that applying the pedestrian cases to bicycles would create "a
perverse system of disincentives" 7 6 that would prevent local
governments from "providing any such [safety] accommodations in
the future for fear that doing so will cause them to incur additional
tort liability," 7' and in fact would "motivate some municipalities to
remove existing public safety accommodations."' Because cyclists
traveled much greater distances than pedestrians, the localization
doctrine threatened to overwhelm state and regional efforts to
accommodate and improve safety for cyclists.
Wayne Township, on the other hand, addressed the issues of
localization and foreseeability head-on. 3
The township
acknowledged that cyclists were foreseeable and permitted users.
Despite this, the township asserted that "the duty of care to
maintain property in a reasonably safe condition by such persons
extends only to those areas which are specifically marked and
designated by the local public entity.""' While the state vehicle
code may extend rights and require vehicle-like duties from
cyclists, this established only that they were, at best, permitted
users.'
In addition, the responsibility for determining who is an
intended user should be controlled exclusively by the municipality
"and not, as plaintiff and the amicus curiae assert, the intent of
the plaintiff or the legislature or some other entity." 7 ' Moreover,
the township asserted, this exclusive localization "makes good
sense,"'
because "in this era of tax caps and dwindling
169. Reply Brief of Appellant at 8, Boub II (No. 84246), available at 1998 WL

34181977 (internal quotations omitted).
170. Brief of Amici Curiae League of Illinois Bicyclists at 36-37, Boub H (No.
84246), availableat 1998 WL 34114740.

171. Id.
172. Id. at 37.
173. Brief of Defendants-Appellees Township of Wayne at 16, Boub II (No.
84246), availableat 1998 WL 34181975.

174.
175.
176.
177.

Id.
Id. at 41.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 31.
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government budgets, it would be patently unfair to permit the
intent of some other person or entity-a user, a planning
commission, some agency of the state or federal government, etc.to define the scope and extent of a local public entity's duty of
"
care." 78
' The township did not cite either the Curatolaamicus brief
(Chicago's "enormity of the burden" proposal) or its incorporation
into Vaughn or Sisk, probably to avoid the appearance of
advocating a blatantly self-serving public policy argument.
In his reply brief, Mr. Boub addressed the "enormity of the
burden" issue, but countered weakly with a "bicycles are different"
argument. 9
This was almost certainly the plaintiffs most
significant strategic error, and resulted from a pre-existing
mindset by cycling advocates and bicycle clubs, who had argued for
decades that they should be treated as roadway vehicles, not
accessory users. 18° Although this doctrine may have been useful in
advocating transportation policy, it was a weak argument when
applied to the duty of care and immunity under the ITLA because
it addressed highway engineering, not local government liability,
which the pedestrian cases had established were distinct issues.
The supreme court also framed the central issue as
determining whether bicyclists were intended users. 8' Although
acknowledging that "bicyclists, unlike pedestrians, are guided by
some of the same signs and pavement markings that motorists
observe," 8 ' the supreme court nevertheless concluded that Sisk's
"physical manifestations of intent" test was appropriate." A local
government had liability under the ITLA only if the local road was
signed and marked for bicycle use."
The court extended the
localization doctrine to hold that the intent of another public
85
entity, "whether it is the state, a county, or other local entity,"
M

178. Id..
179. Reply Brief of Appellant at 6, Boub II (No. 84246), available at 1998 WL
34181977.

[Tihe matter before this Court does not seek to address joggers,
horseback riders, or other potential foreseeable users of the road, only
bicyclists. It is bicyclists who have the historic use of the roads ... it is
bicyclists who are more compatible with traversing roads with vehicles
than they are traversing sidewalks with pedestrians; it is bicyclists who
can and do exist side-by-side with vehicle traffic on the roads.
Id.
180. The history of this doctrine is well-established, but often polemical on
both sides. For a brief summary of the debate, see Bruce Epperson, Sara J.
Hendricks, and Mitchell York, Estimation of Bicycle TransportationDemand
From Limited Data, in COMPENDIUM OF TECHNICAL PAPERS: 65TH ANNUAL
MEETING OF THE INSTITUTE OF TRANSPORTATION ENGINEERS 436-39 (1995).

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Boub 11, 702 N.E.2d at 537.
Id. at 539.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 540.
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was irrelevant. While customary and historical use could be used
as a factor in determining intent, it was not dispositive. 6 To some
degree, the plaintiff prevailed-the court concluded that some non8 7
physical factors could be indicative of intent."
However, only
1
local factors could be considered. " Finally, the supreme court
further legitimized the Vaughn/Sisk doctrine that it is appropriate
to consider the "enormity of the burden," but that it must be just
one of many factors to be weighed. 9
Bicycle advocates were flabbergasted by the Boub II decision.
Unfamiliar with the recent pedestrian cases, most assumed the
ruling was an indictment of cycling. In a vociferous dissent,
Justice Heiple pointed to the "absurd and dangerous"19
discontinuity created between highway and liability policy. At the
same time the state was striving to incorporate bicycle use into
roadway design and use, local governments could effectively
eliminate all responsibility by removing existing physical
manifestations of intent and blocking the installation of new ones.
Justice Heiple, probably referring to Best v. Taylor Machine
Works, 9' a case decided by the supreme court less than a year
before Boub II, complained that had Mr. Boub been on a
motorcycle when he fell, he could have recovered and that "[tihere
is no rational basis for this distinction.""
The clue was
unmistakable: the court in Best had found a 1997 state tort
limitation act violated the Illinois Constitution because it failed
rational basis scrutiny. The Best court determined that the Act
created "arbitrary legislative classifications that discriminate in
favor of a select group without a sound, reasonable basis. " "
D. After Boub: Localization, Foreseeabilityand Enormity of the
Burden
The various districts of the Illinois Appellate Court have since
struggled with almost every aspect of Boub I. In Brooks v. City of
Peoria,a child riding a bicycle on the sidewalk fell into a drainage
"
ditch. 94
' The city, citing Boub II, maintained that its duty of care
186. Id. at 541.
187. Brooks v. City of Peoria, 712 N.E.2d 387, 390 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999);
Diefendorfv. City of Peoria, 720 N.E.2d 655, 659-60 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1999).

188. "As the Boub court established, the intent expressed by the local entity
is controlling." Brooks, 712 N.E.2d at 392. "Under the Act, it is the intent of

the local public entity that controls, and we, therefore [can] look to the code to
determine the intended users of Peoria's sidewalks." Diefendorf, 720 N.E.2d
at 658.
189. Boub 11, 702 N.E.2d at 543.
190. Id. (Heiple, J., dissenting).
191. 689 N.E.2d 1057 (Ill.
1997).
192. Boub 11, 702 N.E.2d at 544 (Heiple, J., dissenting).

193. 689 N.E.2d at 1070.
194. 712 N.E.2d at 388.
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in the maintenance of sidewalks was limited to their use by
pedestrians, and that "[b]icyclists are free to continue to use the
sidewalks if they wish," but that they do so "at their own peril and
risk."195
The appellate court called the city's contention
"offensive,"'" and held that it was "inconsistent with the city's
obligation of reasonable care for all foreseeable users."'97 The
return of foreseeability as an alternative to (and not a subordinate
subclass of) intention placed Brooks at odds with Boub I.
However, the court noted that while the city's line of argument
"may be valid in a case involving an adult bicyclist,"19 "[c]ommon
sense would indicate. . that the nature of a sidewalk includes use
by children."' " It appeared that the Third District was prepared to
carve out special exceptions to Boub II for some identified groups.
Justice Kohler, in a special concurrence, stated this explicitly:
"public policy considerations compel us to conclude that Peoria
owes a duty to its young bicyclists." °°
However, this was a position that came very close to violating
the state supreme court's holding regarding unconstitutional
special laws in Molitor, Harvey, and Best. To cover this exposed
flank, the appellate court held that "the circumstances of this case
20
require a different interpretation of [who is an] intended user." '
The different circumstances? The enormity of the burden! While
Boub II concerned highway use with its potential "costs of
upgrading road conditions to meet the special needs of cyclists,"2 2
sidewalks were different "because the city would not have to
expend additional amounts of resources to upgrade sidewalk
conditions."2 2 Enormity of the burden promised to be the great
leveler that alleviated all problems of disparate treatment.
Two other 1999 cases reached diametrically opposed positions
on the question of whether local ordinances were dispositive in
determining intent. The First District concluded that "if a person
violates a municipal ordinance, that person is not an intended user
of the property,"2 °' while the Fifth District held that "though the
plaintiff may have violated state statutes... plaintiffs breach of
the provision in this case does not destroy the city's duty."2 0 The

195. Id. at 391.
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204. Montano v. City of Chicago, 720 N.E.2d 628, 633 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999),
appeal denied, 729 N.E.2d 498 (Ill. 2000).
205. Sullivan v. City of Hillsboro, 707 N.E.2d 1273, 1276 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999),
appeal denied, 714 N.E.2d 533 (Ill. 1999).
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Fifth District took pains to "point this out to emphasize the
distinction between an unintended and prohibited use of property
and an allegedly negligent plaintiff."
A plaintiff acting legally
and responsibly could be unintended, yet an illegal or negligent
user could still be an intended user, provided that trespass was
not the offense.
A few months after Brooks, the Third District considered the
application of Boub H to an adult sidewalk cyclist." 7 Justice
Koehler, who had written the special concurrence in Brooks,
authored the majority opinion. In an apparent dismissal of the
rationale underlying Brooks, Justice Koehler opened with a return
to the language of Vaughn that "foreseeability, pursuant to the
[ITLAI pertains to use of the municipality's property by permitted
and intended users, not to foreseeable users."'
Failing to find
physical manifestations on the Peoria sidewalk system that would
indicate bicycle use,"° the court turned to local bicycle regulations,
which it also found unhelpful.210 Finally, Justice Koehler turned to
city codes dealing with parades and bicycle licenses to determine
"that some bicyclists, in some circumstances, may be intended
users of Peoria's sidewalks. We do not conclude, however, that this
language does not indicate that all bicyclists are intended
users.... "' The court never addressed how an intended sidewalk
bicyclist could be distinguished from an unintended one,"' and in a
dissent, Justice Breslin complained that the court was trying to
make categories of users function as a measure of foreseeability. s
"Most courts interpreting the Act have seized upon the 'intended
and permitted' language," complained Justice Breslin, "while few
have acknowledged that portion of the Act which speaks of
'reasonably foreseeable' usage. The majority makes the same
mistake.""4
As a litmus test for intention, Justice Breslin
advocated Chicago's "enormity of the burden" test."0 "Boub relied
on the huge financial burden that would be faced by municipalities
if bicyclists were held to be intended users," noted Justice Breslin,
adding that "such concerns are simply not raised by the case at

206. Id. at 1277.
207. Diefendorf,720 N.E.2d at 655.

208.
209.
210.
211.

Id. at 658.
Id. at 659.
Id. at 658.
Id. at 659.
212. Justice Koehler apparently believed, in keeping with his Brooks
concurrence, that it was appropriate to use a dichotomy of adult and infant
cyclists-a vague test he ascribed to "public policy"- to establish intent. Id.
at 660.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 661.
215. Id.
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,6
21

The final severing of any remaining nexus between
foreseeability and intent occurred in a 2001 case, Latimer v.
217
Chicago Park District.
The facts were a mirror image of Brooks.

Ms. Latimer fell while riding in the street from a cracked and
uneven pavement surface.218 She asserted that because the City of
Chicago prohibited adult cyclists from using the sidewalk, she was
an intended user of the city streets.2

19

The court disagreed, holding

that simply because a user was prohibited in one place, she was
not intended in another, even if it was the only plausible
alternative: "Consider, for example, a municipality that has
banned smoking in its government buildings. Although the
municipality might permit smoking in the outdoor areas
surrounding those buildings, it would be absurd to conclude that
the municipality intended for people to smoke in such areas."22 °
Some cyclists have since seized on the smoking analogy to
assert that Illinois courts view adult bicycle use as sociopathic as
smoking. Although understandable, the charge oversimplifies
Illinois municipal tort law. "Intention" has nothing to do with
foreseeability, legality, or most government policies. The concept
of an "intended" user is grounded completely within section 10/2102(a), and is a method of categorization totally unrelated to
traditional
common
law
precepts
of "innocence"
or
"reasonableness." With the possible exception of motor vehicles, a
local government has absolute freedom to differentiate between
otherwise normal, typical, foreseeable users engaging in normal,
typical, foreseeable activities as "intended and permitted" users
and "not intended, but permitted" users.'
There are only two
ways that a user (other than a motor vehicle user) can become an
"intended" user of a roadway: 1) local physical manifestations of
assent; or 2) Illinois general law within the Illinois Tort Liability
Act. 2

Likewise, the rational basis on which such categorization can
be made is unrelated to the character of the user or her use-it is
grounded entirely in the rational reduction of risk exposure. This
point cannot be overemphasized. The rational basis test that any
cyclist must address in a Boub-type case is not "does the
classification of a non-intended user have a rational relation to
highway policy?" or even, "does the classification have a rational
relation to risk allocation?" The standard that will be applied is
216. Id.
217. 752 N.E.2d 1161 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001).
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220.
221.
222.
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"does the classification have a rational relation to reducing local
government expenditures on otherwise legally meritorious tort
claims?"
Latimer was an awkwardly reasoned case because the court
failed to correctly analogize it to Sisk. In Vaughn, the supreme
court had reduced the Di Domenico's "necessary, therefore
intended" exception to "not otherwise possible, therefore
intended."22
In Sisk, the supreme court ruled it out entirely:
"Although it may become necessary at times for pedestrians to
walk on county roads, such use is not a manifestation of the local
municipality's intent.. .22'
Latimer was simply the next step:
simply because the municipality denies the use of all available
alternatives, that does not mean the remaining permitted use is
intended. As the Latimer court put it:
Plaintiff is essentially posing the question: If I cannot ride on the
sidewalk, where does the city expect me to ride? The city has a
codified answer: You are prohibited from riding on the sidewalk, and
further, you are permitted to ride where we have not prohibited
riding. But is our intent that when riding a bicycle, you use [only]
marked bicycle lanes ....
E.

Conclusions

Although the shifting judicial history of the ITLA, especially
after 1990, makes it difficult to draw any definitive conclusions,
some trends do appear.
1.

Localization

The Illinois Supreme Court has clearly determined that,
except for the use of motor vehicles on roadways, the most
localized level of government has the right to determine intent.
Although the early cases in this area, such as Locigno and Deren,
placed primacy on signage and roadway markings, the post-Boub
H cases appear to signal a willingness to draw on a wider variety
of information: physical improvements, codes and ordinances,
plans, and policies. All, however, must be issued at the most
localized level of government. As the supreme court stated in
Boub I: "it is the intent of the local public entity that controls;
accordingly, the intent of another public body, whether it is the
state, a county, or other local entity, should be irrelevant."22

223. 651 N.E.2d at 1118. "It was not impossible for plaintiff to reach her
destination without stepping into the street. ..

."

Id.

224. 657 N.E.2d at 907.
225. 752 N.E.2d at 1165 (internal citations omitted).
226. 702 N.E.2d at 540.
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2. Foreseeabilityand Intent
The relationship between foreseeability and intent under the
ITLA continues to be ambiguous. Diefendorf strikes a forceful
tone: "'Foreseeability, pursuant to the language of the Act...
pertains to the use of the municipality's property by permitted and
intended users, not to foreseeable users.. . ." The supreme court,
however, has been very reluctant to address the issue in a
straightforward manner, probably for two reasons.
First,
appellate Justice Chapman's incisive dissent in 1992's Gabriel so
clearly delineated the issue that it would be almost impossible to
address it without grappling with his reasoning. Moreover, the
City of Chicago's enormity of the burden test-which requires a
priori that any unintended user be deemed unforeseeableappears to have sobered the supreme court since it was proposed
in Curatola. The refusal of the supreme court to hear any cases
after Boub 11 that have attempted-with spectacular failure-to
sort out users that are careful, negligent, adult, or infant and that
were engaged in acts that are legal, illegal, predictable, or
remarkable indicates their disinclination to deal with the subject.
The supreme court's mantra appears to be "locally designated,
with physical manifestations of intent."
3. Enormity of the Burden
In Curatola,the supreme court distanced itself from the City
of Chicago proposal, and even went so far as to back down from its
previous position that intent is always a matter of law, opening
the door to the possibility of allowing the jury to consider facts in
determining intent.228 The cases after Curatola, including Sisk
and Boub 11, seem to suggest that the supreme court is satisfied
with its localization doctrine, which assumes that roads are solely
for motor vehicles in the absence of signage and road markings.
Enormity of the burden appears to be primarily a justification for
localization, a factor local governments may consider when they
decide whether to place signs and markings. Only the third
district has applied the test in Brooks and Diefendorf to justify
disparate treatment of sidewalks and streets. However, the first
district's analogy of cyclists to smokers, although never since
applied, threatens to reinvigorate the issue.
III. Is

THERE A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF INTRASTATE TRAVEL?

Title 42, § 1983 of the United States Code provides that:
227. 720 N.E.2d at 658.
228. 608 N.E.2d at 888. "In cases where factual issues are presented
concerning whether a particular plaintiff is owed this duty [to maintain the
street area around parking], such issues may be determined by the jury upon
proper instruction." Id.
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Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of
Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress .... 22
Thus, § 1983 only applies where a violation of the federal
Constitution occurs. What then is the constitutional right that the
Illinois Tort Liability Act violates? This section will argue that it
may violate an implied right of localized travel. This is not the
right of interstate migration that has been recognized in several
°
U.S. Supreme Court cases," but a "right to travel locally through
1
Although not directly addressed
public spaces and roadways."
by the Supreme Court, a sufficient body of federal law exists to
plausibly maintain that there is such a right. Reviewing the body
of applicable case law, one federal circuit court found that seven
different clauses or combination of clauses within the Constitution
2
have been asserted as the source of a right to local travel.
Arguably the most appropriate source for an intrastate right is the
3
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Simply identifying a new and unique constitutional right is, of
course, inadequate to invalidate the ITLA or any judicial
interpretation of it. However, there are grounds for believing that
it may be a useful tool. The Supreme Court, in Owen v. City of
Independence,' determined that local governments do not have
5
In
immunity from § 1983 suits for constitutional infringements.
are
that
Canton v. Harris,"6 it said that local government policies
themselves constitutional, but have a causal connection to an

229. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

230. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941) (holding state prohibition on

immigration of "indigent persons" violates the Commerce Clause); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (holding a one year state residency
requirement to qualify for welfare benefits violates equal protection clause of

Fourteenth Amendment and due process provisions of Fifth Amendment);

Mem'l Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974) (one year state
residency requirement as precondition to receiving subsidized non-emergency

medical care amounts to "invidious discrimination"); Supreme Court of N.H. v.
Piper, 470 U.S. 274 (1985) (residency as precondition to state bar license is
unconstitutional); Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999) (preferential treatment to

long-term state residents for Aid to Families with Dependent Children violates
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
231. Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 310 F.3d 484, 498 (6th Cir. 2002).

232. Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255, 260-61 (3d Cir. 1990).
233. Id. at 267.
234. 445 U.S. 622 (1980).

235. Id. at 657.
236. 489 U.S. 378 (1989).
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unconstitutional
deprivation,
may
ultimately
be
held
unconstitutional. 7 This application will be explored in the next
section of this Article.
A vast body of law exists regarding the constitutional right of
travel between states,"8 but a much smaller number of cases deal
with intrastate travel. 9 Unfortunately, both bodies of literature
deal with constitutional issues far removed from the question of
transport mobility. In one of the most recent right to travel cases,
Saenz v. Roe,240 Justice Stevens described the traditional meaning
of the phrase "right to travel":
The right to travel discussed in our cases embraces at least three
different components. It protects the right of a citizen of one State
to enter and to leave another State, the right to be treated as a
welcome visitor rather than an unfriendly alien when temporarily
present in the second State, and, for those travelers who elect to
become permanent residents, the right to be treated like other
citizens of that State.24'
Saenz borrowed a two-part test taken from an earlier
migration case, Shapiro v. Thompson.242 A state regulation must
pass strict scrutiny analysis if: 1) it restricts migration; and 2) the
travel is undertaken for the purpose of securing a basic life
necessity.2" When the Supreme Court turned to an analysis of
local travel in Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County,2" it applied
the same test to a state residency requirement that restricted the
access of recent immigrants into a county to subsidized medical
care, even if they emigrated from another county within the same
state.2 45 Although Justice Marshall's majority opinion disclaimed
specific applicability of the decision to intrastate travel, 46 footnote
nine strongly suggested that the second prong of the Shapiro test
was more determinative than the source of the immigration
47
contained in the first prong.1
237. Id. at 396.
238. See generally Leonard B. Boudin, The ConstitutionalRight to Travel, 56
COLUM. L. REV. 47 (1956).
239. See Andrew C. Porter, Toward A ConstitutionalAnalysis of the Right to
IntrastateTravel, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 820 (1992).
240. 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
241. Id. at 500.
242. 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969) (holding a one-year residency was required
before being eligible for welfare benefits).
243. Porter, supra note 239, at 828-29.
244. 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
245. Id. at 263-64.
246. Id. at 255-56. "Even were we to draw a constitutional distinction
between interstate and intrastate travel, a question we do not now consider,
such a distinction would not support the judgment of the Arizona court
[because one of the appellants migrated from another state]." Id. at 256.
247. Id. at 256 n.9.

It would seem inconsistent to argue that the residence requirement
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In a 1971 case, Bell v.Burson,2 concerning the obligation for
due process prior to the revocation of a Georgia driver's license,
the Court inferred that local mobility was itself a "basic life
necessity":
Once [drivers'] licenses are issued, as in the petitioner's case, their
continued possession may become essential in the pursuit of a
livelihood.... In such cases the licenses are not to be taken away
without that procedural due process required by the Fourteenth
Amendment. This is but an application of the general proposition
that relevant constitutional restraints limit state power to
whether the entitlement is denominated a
terminate an entitlement
249
"right" or a "privilege.
Notice that the Bell court expanded the second prong of the
Shapiro test. A Georgia driver's license is an entitlement if it may
become "essential in the pursuit of a livelihood"; it is not required
that the state resident actually prove that her license is presently
necessary to make a living. It is a reasonable inference that if local
to secure basic life necessity, it is a
travel may be necessary
250
entitlement.
protected
In a few cases the Supreme Court has directly, if lightly,
addressed the concept of a right to mobility. In the Passenger
Cases, Chief Justice Taney noted that "[w]e are all citizens of the
United States; and as members of the same community, must have
the right to pass and repass through every part of it without
25
interruption, as freely as in our own states." ' The Court also
tangentially addressed the use of local roads in United States v.
Guest.252 Six individuals were indicted for violating a federal
statute by conspiring to deprive people of African descent from the
free use of private and public facilities. They were indicted by a
grand jury on five counts, of which the third and fourth counts
alleged a conspiracy to:

should be construed to bar longtime Arizona residents, even if
unconstitutional as applied to persons migrating into Maricopa County
from outside the State. Surely, longtime residents of neighboring
counties have more ties with Maricopa County and equity in its public
programs, as through past payment of state taxes, than do migrants
from distant States.
Id.
248. 402 U.S. 535 (1971).

249. Id. at 539 (internal citations omitted).

250. Part III of this Article will address the issue of whether localized travel

is an entitlement "by virtue of the fact that [it has] been initially recognized
and protected by state law." Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710 (1976).
251. Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. 283, 492 (1849) (Taney, C.J., dissenting)
The Passenger Cases concerned New York and
(emphasis added).
Massachusetts immigration taxes. The taxes were declared unconstitutional;
Chief Justice Taney dissented. Id. at 463-64 (Taney, C.J., dissenting).
252. 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1965).
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[Ilntimidate Negro citizens of the United States in the free exercise
and enjoyment of:

[3] The right to the full and equal use on the same terms as white
citizens of the public streets and highways in the vicinity of Athens,
Georgia.

[4] The right to travel freely to and from the State of Georgia and to
use highway facilities and other instrumentalities of interstate
commerce within the State of Georgia. 253
A federal district court dismissed all five counts of the
indictment, maintaining that none involved rights of national
citizenship.2 " The Supreme Court reversed on both counts three
and four. While the Court determined that the conspiracy violated
the right of travel, it carefully pointed out that the third count,
regarding the local use of streets, was not included in this
analysis, but was covered in a separate evaluation based on the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.255 The
Court thus equated free access to streets and roadways for local
travel with the use of any other vital public facility.
The most direct treatment of the right to localized travel by
the Supreme Court was in Papachristouv. City of Jacksonville,56
where the Court struck down a local vagrancy ordinance that,
among other acts, made it illegal to be a "common night walker" or
to be caught "wandering or strolling around from place to place
without any lawful purpose or object." 57 Justice Douglas observed:
The Jacksonville ordinance makes criminal activities which by
modern standards are normally innocent. "Nightwalking" is one.
[The State of] Florida construes the ordinance not to make criminal
one night's wandering, only the habitual wanderer or, as the
ordinance describes it, "common night walkers." We know, however,
from experience that sleepless people often walk at night, perhaps
hopeful that sleep-inducing relaxation will result .... If I choose to
take up an evening walk to see if Andromeda has come up on
schedule, I think I am entitled to look for the distant light of Almach
and Mirach without finding myself staring into the blinding beam of
a police flashlight. 2
Although

253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.

Justice

Douglas

made

Id. at 757 & n.13.
Id. at 747-48.
Id. at 755-57 & n.13.
405 U.S. 156 (1972).
Id. at 158 n.1.
Id. at 164 n.6 (internal citations omitted).
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nocturnal perambulation, he was less forthcoming about exactly
which constitutional right protected it, noting only that the
Jacksonville ordinance was void for vagueness because it "fails to
give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his
259
and that "it encourages
contemplated conduct is forbidden,"
6
arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions.""
Three years later, a federal district court was more helpful
when presented with a similar ordinance in Middletown,
261
The
Pennsylvania that imposed a nocturnal juvenile curfew.
Middletown ordinance was carefully crafted to carve out an
exception for any minor passing through the town on interstate
travel. 2 The district court was therefore obligated to consider the
curfew strictly on its adverse impact to Mr. Bykofsky's right of
intrastate travel, if such a thing existed. The court determined
that it did:
The rights of locomotion, freedom of movement, to go where one
pleases, and to use the public streets in a way that does not
interfere with the personal liberty of others are basic values
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" protected by the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. One may be on the
streets even though he is there for merely for exercise, recreation,
walking, standing, talking, socializing, or 2any other purpose that
does not interfere with other persons' rights.
The district court noted, however, that Mr. Bykofsky was a
minor, and as such did not enjoy the full fundamental rights of
The court
substantive due process appropriate for an adult."
the
weighing
test
interest-balancing-means
an
therefore applied
movement
of
freedom
of
right
minor's
the
against
interests
town's
In this context, the court
and the use of public streets.2'
unconstitutionally impinge
not
"does
curfew
the
that
determined
on the minor's right to travel."
267
The decision was affirmed by the Third Circuit, and Mr.
Bykofsky appealed on a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court. It
was denied,2 but Justice Marshall dissented:
259. Id. at 162.
260. Id.
261. Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242, 1245 (M.D.
Penn.1975).
262. Id. at 1247.
263. Id. at 1254. The similarity of the district court's language here to that
1909), and the muchin Molway v. City of Chicago, 88 N.E. 485, 490-93 (Ill.
abused VanCleef v. City of Chicago, 88 N.E. 815, 816-17 (Ill. 1909), should be

noted. Although the Illinois state cases may be down, they are not yet out.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.

Bykofsky, 401 F. Supp. at 1255.

Id.
Id. at 1262.
Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir. 1976).
Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 429 U.S. 964 (1976).
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The freedom to leave one's house and move about at will is "of the
very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty," and hence is protected
against state intrusions by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. To justify a law that significantly intrudes
on this freedom, therefore, a State must demonstrate that
the law is
"narrowly drawn" to further a "compelling state interest."26 9
After Bykofsky, it appeared that courts were willing to
recognize some kind of right to local travel. There seemed to be a
rough consensus that this right probably originated somewhere
other than either of the two privileges and immunities clauses in
the Constitution, and that it should be scrutinized using a
standard more rigorous than ordinary rational basis, but less
exacting than strict scrutiny.
The most complete analysis came fourteen years later, and it
arose in a case occurring only a few miles from Middletown. In
1988, the City of York, Pennsylvania enacted a cruising ordinance
that prohibited driving more than twice past a designated traffic
control point within any two-hour period between 7:00 p.m. and
3:30 a.m.27 °
David Lutz, an automobile equipment dealer
specializing in hot-rod parts, filed suit in federal court seeking an
injunction against the law, asserting that it was overbroad and
violated his right to travel. 71 The case eventually wound up in the
Third Circuit, where Judge Becker, noting that the question of
whether a right of intrastate travel exists posed a threshold
issue ,272 elected to undertake a complete review of the problem.
Judge Becker identified seven different constitutional
provisions that Supreme Court Justices had, at various times,
suggested were the source of a right of travel, 72 including the two
Privileges and Immunities Clauses, the two Due Process Clauses,
the Commerce Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and "a
conception of national citizenship said to be implicit in 'the
structure of the Constitution itself.' 274 Noting that each provision
served very different purposes and thus "could have dramatically
different scope and coverage depending on the constitutional
provision from which it is derived," 75 Judge Becker ruled that "the
Court recently has provided precious little guidance on which of
them presently give rise to a right to travel, and the respective
scopes of each."276
The Third Circuit decided that the right of localized travel
269. Id. at 964-65 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
270. Lutz, 899 F.2d at 257.
271. Steven N. Gofman, Car Cruising: One Generation's Innocent Fun
Becomes The Next Generation'sCrime, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 1, 12-13 (2002).
272. Lutz, 899 F.2d at 259.
273. Id. at 260-61.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 261.
276. Id.
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originated from substantive due process and that "the right to
move freely about one's neighborhood or town ... is indeed
'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' and 'deeply rooted in the
Nation's history.' 271
27
Over a decade later, the Sixth Circuit concurred:
The right to travel locally through public spaces and roadwaysperhaps more than any other right secured by substantive due
process-is an everyday right, a right we depend on to carry out our
daily life activities.... Freedom of movement, at home and abroad,
is important for job and business opportunities-for cultural,
political, and social activities-for all the commingling which
279
gregarious man enjoys.
Having determined the threshold issue, Judge Becker then
Although
turned to the standard of review to be applied.
have
process
due
substantive
fundamental rights emanating from
the
standard,
scrutiny
a
strict
traditionally been evaluated using
to
analogous
more
was
travel
localized
that
Sixth Circuit argued
speech:
free
The right to travel cannot conceivably imply the right to travel
whenever, wherever and however one pleases.... Unlimited access
to public fora or roadways would result not in maximizing
individuals' opportunity to engage in protected activity, but
chaos.... Therefore, in order to set out a workable jurisprudence
for the newly recognized due process right of localized movement on
the public roadways, we find it appropriate to borrow from the wellsettled, highly analogous rules the Court has developed in the free
speech context.2 °
As Judge Becker's line of reasoning indicates, the analogy
between free speech and freedom of mobility results less from any
inherent constitutional similarities than from the practical
requirements of fair administration and adjudication. Towards
this end, the Third Circuit determined that time, place, and
manner restrictions on localized travel should be upheld if they
28
are "narrowly tailored to meet significant city objectives." '
Interestingly, the Lutz court failed to incorporate the other major
requirement of the free speech time, place, and manner doctrinethat ample alternative channels for communication must be left
open.282
Three cases in rapid succession applied the time, place, and

277. Id. at 268.
278. Johnson, 310 F.3d at 495.

279. Id. at 498.
280. Lutz, 899 F.2d at 269-70.
281. Id. at 270. The Third Circuit held that the York cruising ordinance did
meet the required standard.
282. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293-94 (1984);
Gofman, supra note 271 at 31 n.79.
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manner analogy used in Lutz. In Scheunemann v. City of West
Bend,"M the Wisconsin Court of Appeals applied the Lutz standard
to an anti-cruising ordinance almost verbatim, but added that
restrictions to local travel must be "not one which merely promotes
a self-serving interest of government at the expense of the
constitutional right of the people to freedom of movement."'
A year later, a Minnesota state appeals court adopted the
Scheunemann variant of the test in State v. Stallman.'
The
Minnesota court identified a provision within the earlier West
Bend ordinance that allowed a driver to explain the lawful purpose
of her trip in the field as a valid defense."
Without such a
provision, the Anoka ordinance was arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement was inevitable:
It is clear from the Anoka Police Department's statement of the
problem that this ordinance is aimed at an "undesirable" class of
people.... [In Anoka, if a member of the "undesirable" class states
a legitimate business or personal reason to the officer, they will still
be given a citation to discourage them from coming to Anoka
287
again.
In 1995, the California Supreme Court upheld a municipal
ordinance prohibiting camping or the storage of camping
equipment in any public place..2 ' The court acknowledged that
"the right to intrastate travel (which includes intramunicipal
travel) is a basic human right protected by the United States and
California Constitutions as a whole." 29 However, the California
court concluded that such a right could be violated only when a
direct restriction of travel occurs."
Ordinances that place an
indirect or incidental burden on intramunicipal travel require only
M
a rational and legitimate public purpose."
The court did not
specify the level of analysis to be applied to direct travel
restrictions. In an earlier case, In re White, the state supreme
court found that parole conditions imposed on a convicted
prostitute, prohibiting her from entering certain sections of
Fresno, were a direct burden on her right of intramunicipal travel,
but declined to apply a review standard, declaring that "[tihere is
no exact formula for the determination of reasonableness. Each
283. 507 N.W.2d 163 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993).
284. Id. at 167.

285. 519 N.W.2d 903, 907-09 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994).
286. Id. at 907.

287. Id. at 908-09. The similarity of "undesirable" to "unintended"especially in the context of the City of Chicago's "enormity of the burden"
test-should not be overlooked.
288. Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 892 P.2d 1145, 1169 (Cal. 1995).
289. Id. at 1163 (citing In re White, 158 Cal. Rptr. 562, 567 (Cal. Ct. App.

1979)).
290. Tobe, 892 P.2d at 1163.

291. Id. at 1163-64.
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case must be decided on its own facts and circumstances." 2 In a
lengthy dissent, Associate Justice Mosk argued for both the
3
application of Lutz, and its time, place and manner test.2
Most recently, the Sixth Circuit heard an appeal to a case
quite similar to In re White. The plaintiffs in Johnson v. City of
Cincinnati were two convicted drug offenders prohibited by a City
ordinance from entering the "Over the Rhine" neighborhood
adjacent to downtown Cincinnati."9 In this case, it was the city
that relied on Lutz, asserting that its ordinance was a reasonable
time, place, and manner restriction.'
The court rejected the
suggestion, determining that "broadly prohibiting individuals to
access [an] entire neighborhood" required the application of strict
scrutiny analysis. 7 The Sixth Circuit favorably reviewed the
Third Circuit's analysis in Lutz, and noted that "we do not
foreclose the possibility of applying intermediate scrutiny to a less
severe regulation of localized travel," 8 but argued that "unlike a
'time' or 'manner' regulation, a 'place' regulation is more difficult
to transfer from the First Amendment context to the localized
travel context."2"
In a dissent," Judge Gilman maintained that the U. S.
Supreme Court determined in the 1993 case Bray v. Alexandria
Women's Health Clinic'' that there was no right of intrastate
travel, citing a passage from Justice Scalia's plurality opinion:

[TIhe only "actual barriers to... movement" that would have
resulted from petitioners' proposed demonstrations would have been
in the immediate vicinity of the abortion clinics, restricting
movement from one portion of the Commonwealth of Virginia to
another. Such a purely intrastate restriction does not implicate the
right of interstate travel, even if it is applied intentionally against
travelers from other states, unless it is applied discriminatorily
against them.302
The plain reading of the passage appears to refute Judge
Gilman's assertion.
Justice Scalia was arguing that the
protestors, who were prohibiting all women from entering the
health center, were not interfering with interstate travel. His
comments were not directed at the issue of whether there is such a
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.

In re White, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 566.
Tobe, 892 P.2d at 1181.
Id. at 1183.
Johnson, 310 F.3d at 487-89.
Id. at 502.
Id.

298. Id.
299. Id. at 502 n.7. The court stated that "a narrow 'place' restriction might
be more appropriately analyzed under intermediate scrutiny." Id.
300. Id. at 508.
301. 506 U.S. 263 (1993).

302. Id. at 277.
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thing as the right of intrastate travel, which neither side asserted.
However, the emphasis that Justice Scalia placed on the word
"discriminatorily" suggests that he may have been thinking in
terms of intrastate travel. Judge Gilman (and Justice Kennedy in
his dissent) appears
to assume that the emphasized
"discriminatorily" refers to discrimination between inter- and
intrastate travelers. 3 But the plaintiffs in Bray claimed they
were discriminated against because they were women, or,
alternatively, pregnant women."° If this is the discrimination
referred to, then Justice Scalia appears to be suggesting that if the
travel of "any person or class of persons"-the categories protected
by 28 U.S.C § 1985-is discriminatorily interfered with, a federal
violation has occurred regardless of whether that travel was
interstate or intrastate. This interesting possibility is examined in
greater depth in the next section of this Article.
The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Johnson in June
2003 .305 To date, it remains the latest word on the issue, and
suggests that there is some nascent right of intrastate travel,
regardless of whether it is labeled access, mobility, or localized or
intramunicipal travel.
IV. APPLYING CIVIL RIGHTS TO BOUB: SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY,
NEGLIGENCE, AND DUE PROCESS

Even assuming that there is a constitutionally protected right
of local travel, the search for a legal mechanism to disable the
"permitted and intended" provision of the Illinois Tort Immunity
Act is far from assured. A maze of issues, including the sovereign
immunity of states, the role of scienter in determining whether a
deprivation is unconstitutional, and the importance of postdeprivation procedure in creating a deprivation, clouds the
application of any federal civil rights statute, and calls into
question what constitutional claim is best applied.
A. The Illinois Tort Law as a Deprivationof the Right of Local
Travel
In general, the Eleventh Amendment provides states with
immunity in federal court from suit for damages under 42 U.S.C
§ 1983 absent a clear congressional mandate to the contrary.3
Such immunity, however, does not apply to state courts, who are
bound by the Constitution's Supremacy Clause to extend
303.
by its
equal
304.
305.
306.
apply

Id. at 336-38. "The implausibility of the Court's readings... is matched
conclusion that a burden on interstate travel is permissible as long as an
burden is imposed on local travelers." Id. at 337.
Id. at 266-69.
539 U.S. 915 (2003).
Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 339-40 (1978). This prohibition does not
to strictly injunctive relief. Id. at 338.
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jurisdiction to suits under § 1983 for the redress of constitutional
rights violations. 7° While this includes all arms of the state
government, such as school districts,3 8 it does not include
municipalities, which the Supreme Court determined, in Owen v.
City of Independence,3" are liable for their constitutional violations
in both federal and state court.3 10 The Owen Court summarized
the issue in this way:
Municipal defenses-including an assertion of sovereign
immunity-to a federal right of action are, of course, controlled by
federal law. A construction of the federal statute which permitted a
state immunity defense to have controlling effect would transmute a
basic guarantee into an illusory promise; and the supremacy clause
of the Constitution insures that the proper construction may be
enforced.31'
Further complicating the issue is the uncertainty as to exactly
which municipal actions are implicated. In a 1981 case, Parrattv.
Taylor,3 ' the Supreme Court stated that "[niothing in the
language of § 1983 or its legislative history limits the statute
solely to intentional deprivations of constitutional rights."13 Only
five years later, however, the Court, in two concurrent cases,
Daniels v. Williams3" and Davidson v. Cannon,'' determined that
"[ulpon reflection we... overrule Parratt to the extent that it
states that mere lack of due care by a state official may 'deprive'
an individual of life, liberty or property under the Fourteenth
Amendment."3 " However, Footnote three in Daniels noted that
"something less than intentional conduct, such as recklessness or
'gross negligence'" may suffice to support a § 1983 suit.31 7
The ITLA does define "willful and wanton" conduct in section
1-210 as that which "shows an actual or deliberate intention to
cause harm," or that "shows an utter indifference to or conscious
disregard for the safety of others or their property."3 ' However,
the section limits applicability of the definition "to any case" where
a wanton and willful standard is contained within a defined
immunity."9 Neither section 3-102 (maintenance) nor section 3307. Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 380 (1990).
308. Id. at 377.
309. 445 U.S. 622, 647-48 (1979).
310. Id. See also Monell v. N.Y. City Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691
n.54 (1978).
311. 445 U.S. at 648 n.30 (internal citations omitted).
312. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
313. Id. at 534.
314. 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
315. 474 U.S. 344 (1986).
316. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330-31.
317. Davidson, 474 U.S. at 334 n.3.
318. 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/1-210.
319. Id.
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103 (design) explicitly state a wanton and willful standard, and
the issue remained unresolved for many years as to whether
statutory silence implied 1) a common law duty of care, in which
willful and wanton conduct would not be shielded, or 2) no duty of
care at all, in which case wanton and willful conduct would not be
actionable.
The issue was decided by the Illinois Supreme Court in 1997
in In re Chicago Flood Litigation.320 The court determined that
where the legislature omitted a limit to the immunity provided in
each individual section of the ITLA, it intended to immunize both
negligent and wanton and willful misconduct. 321
Therefore, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 could create a cause of action
where none would otherwise exist. Assume two possible scenarios,
using the Boub case as an example. In the first scenario, Illinois
courts determine that a right of localized travel exists, and that
Mr. Boub may have suffered a constitutional deprivation when the
township failed to exercise the ordinary reasonable care necessary
to accommodate his roadway use. In this situation, Mr. Boub
could sue for the constitutional violation, as the ITLA does not bar
actions for constitutional deprivations.322 It is less certain if action
on the underlying negligence action would still be blocked-Illinois
courts have made it clear that one can sue for equitable relief on
the underlying tort that creates a constitutional deprivation, but
there is no corresponding case on point for legal remedies."u
If the constitutional right has yet to be established, the
situation is more complex. Provided that Wayne Township's
actions were merely negligent, Mr. Boub could not sue on the
underlying tort (due to the ITLA), or on the constitutional
deprivation (due to the culpability requirement imposed by
Daniels and Davidson). If Wayne Township's actions were wanton
and willful, the ITLA would still block suit, but footnote three in
Daniels suggests that Mr. Boub could then bring action under
§ 1983. Moreover, the dividing line between mere negligence and
wanton or willful conduct under § 1983 is not nearly as bright as
Daniels and Davidson suggest.

320. 680 N.E.2d 265 (Ill. 1997).
321. Id. at 273. Previous drafts of this Article came to an opposite
conclusion, and John Stainthorp, Esq. kindly pointed out both the error and

the correct citation, which the author very much appreciates. It should be
noted that section 3-106, the section of the ITLA concerning immunity for

recreational facilities, which I hypothesized in Section II of this Article was
the likely source for the language in ITLA section 103-102, does contain a

wanton and willful conduct limitation. See Birlingame v. Chi. Park Dist., 689
N.E.2d 234, 236 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001).
322. People ex. rel. Birkett v. City of Chicago, 758 N.E.2d 25, 30 (Ill. App. Ct.

2001).
323. Id. at 32.
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324
A 1989 case, Canton v. Harris,
drew a sharp distinction
between municipal acts and municipal policies. Mrs. Harris was
arrested by the Canton Police Department and brought to the
police station. Despite exhibiting signs of mental incoherence and
physical illness, no medical attention was summoned. As a result,
Mrs. Harris later required extensive hospitalization and
outpatient care. Instead of suing the city for its negligence, she
sued the city under § 1983, alleging that the city had a policy of
providing inadequate training to its police staff, resulting in a lack
of proper medical attention. 25
The Canton court made two significant findings. First, a
municipal policy need not be unconstitutional by itself if its
application creates a constitutional deprivation.326 Second, a policy
can create municipal liability under § 1983 "only where its policies
are the 'moving force [behind] the constitutional violation.'3 27
Although this would initially appear to be a straightforward
causality requirement, it is not. The Court held that "[olnly where
a municipality's failure ... in a relevant respect evidences a
'deliberate indifference' to the rights of its inhabitants can such a
shortcoming be properly thought of as a city 'policy or custom' that
is actionable under § 1983."
Furthermore, it must be this
"indifference," not the policy itself, that creates the action that
violates the Constitution. 329 However, "indifference" is used in
Canton in more than one way. One interpretation of indifference
is a policy that leaves municipal employees unable to "respond
properly to the usual and recurring situations with which they
must deal."' ° This interpretation focuses on the actions of frontline employees. But another section of the opinion suggests that it
is the actions of the policymakers themselves that matter: "But it
may happen that in light of the duties assigned to specific officers
or employees... the inadequacy [is] so likely to result in the
violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the city
can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the
need."'
In either situation (a policy creates actions by front-line
personnel that are deliberately indifferent, or the decision itself
was created with deliberate indifference by policymakers) the
situation encroaches into the forbidden territory of footnote three
in Daniels, and makes the policymaking entity fair game for a

324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.

489 U.S. 378 (1989).
Id. at 381-82.
Id. at 386-87.
Id. at 389.
Id.
Id. at 391.
Id.
Id. at 390.

The John MarshallLaw Review

[38:545

§ 1983 suit. In this regard, the reliance that the Illinois Supreme
Court placed on localization in defining an intended user in Boub
II is vital.
By giving local governments the final say in
determining who is an intended user through the installation of
crosswalks, bike lanes, signage and other roadway markings, 32 the
state court's interpretation of the ITLA creates exactly the type of
"deliberate indifference" that was the subject of Canton. This is
particularly true if the Chicago "enormity of the burden" test is
used, as the deliberate indifference becomes inversely proportional
to need for attention.
Even if the proximate action is a mere "garden variety tort," a
specific act of negligent maintenance could rise to the level of
Canton's "deliberate indifference" if it results either from a local
government policy decision that creates indifference by front-line
municipal workers or the decision itself is tantamount to
This was the
deliberate indifference by decision makers.
conclusion of the Illinois Appellate Court, First District, in 2000,
who heard a municipal tort immunity claim resulting from an
The municipality
allegedly negligently maintained airport.83
claimed that the alleged defect (an old drainage swale that was
dangerously placed) resulted from a discretionary decision not to
pay for relocation, and thus section 3-102 did not apply and there
was no duty of care. 4
The court disagreed, holding that "[elvery failure to maintain
property could be described as an exercise of discretion .... The
legislature could not have intended such a result; otherwise it
would not have codified the common law duty to maintain
Perpetuating a hazardous
property under section 3-102... ."'
condition does not become a discretionary act simply because it
acquires the patina of time. It is, instead, a decision to not provide
appropriate maintenance that removes section 3-102 immunity-it
functions identically to Canton's "deliberately indifferent"
ministerial actions.
In Anderson, the airport swale case, the intended user status
of the crashed aircraft was never in doubt. However, in a situation
where one's user status under section 3-102 is in question, Canton
could provide the safeguard that would prevent the ITLA tail from
wagging the dog: a policy decision not to provide maintenance,

332. Boub 11, 702 N.E. 2d at 540. "As we have noted, under... the Tort
Immunity Act it is the intent of the local public entity that controls;
accordingly, the intent of another public body, whether it is the state, a

county, or other local entity, should be irrelevant." Id.
333. Anderson v. Alberto-Culver USA, Inc., 740 N.E.2d 819 (Ill. App. Ct.

2000).
334. 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/2-201. Section 10/2-201 of the ITLA immunizes
all local policy decisions, even those abusively exercised.
335. Anderson, 740 N.E.2d at 829.
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followed by the decision to exclude as intended users those groups
placed at highest risk by the omitted maintenance, with the
enormity of the burden test proving the justifying link between the
creation of the risk and the exclusion. In such a scenario, Canton
would provide the link between the local government action and
the constitutional deprivation (deliberate indifference), while
Anderson would prevent the maintenance decision from being
immunized as a discretionary decision. Thus, a right of localized
travel would create a separate cause of action. The constitutional
violation would not be the result of the tort itself, but would flow
from a policy of deliberate indifference created by extending
ordinary reasonable care in maintenance only to intended users,
and not all reasonably foreseeable users.
The
Admittedly, the logic is less than straightforward.
argument starts with the assumption that there is a maintenance
failure of some type. The underlying tort action is negligence, and
the overlying constitutional suit asserts violation of the right to
localized travel. Section 3-102 blocks the cause of action on the
tort, and Daniels and Davidson block the claim on the
constitutional issue. The Canton deliberate indifference test
allows the plaintiff to circumvent Daniels and Davidson by turning
an ongoing garden variety negligence tort into an entrenched
municipal policy of deprivation, while the Illinois case, Anderson,
prevents the defendant from arguing that this shift from
municipal act to municipal policy on the constitutional argument
requires a parallel shift from ministerial act to discretionary act
on the tort issue. While the Supreme Court has determined that
municipal acts may accrete into policies for the purpose of
evaluating constitutional deprivations, the Illinois Supreme Court
has concluded the opposite for determining ministerial negligence.
In summary, assuming that a right of local travel could be
established as a constitutional right, Owen and Canton provide the
means of bringing a § 1983 suit against a municipality, even if the
deprivation results from the negligent acts of a governmental unit.
Owen permits § 1983 suits against municipalities in federal court,
and Howlett prevents state immunity statutes from blocking such
suits in state courts. Although Daniels and Davidson initially
appear to prevent the type of simple negligence found in Boub II
from forming the basis of a § 1983 action, Canton appears to
supply a way to circumvent this hurdle by establishing that the
tort emanated from a policy that either: 1) resulted from
policymaking indifference; or 2) resulted in indifference by frontline employees or agents.
B. What if There Isn't a Right of Local Travel? Falling back on
Due Processand Equal Protection
In addition to the issue of whether there is such a thing as a
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negligent deprivation of constitutional rights, the Parratt court
inquired into the question of due process. Here, the focus shifts
from local travel as a constitutional right requiring protection to
the more established ground of protecting procedural due process
rights. Noting that "[tihe Fourteenth Amendment protects only
against deprivations 'without due process of law,' " " Justice
Rehnquist argued that in the case of a negligent deprivation, it
was impossible to provide a pre-deprivation process because the
time, place and nature of the deprivation could not be known."? In
such a situation, a post-deprivation process "of some kind"3 8 is
adequate to meet the requirements of the Fourteenth
Amendment." 9
Three years after Parratt v. Taylor, the Supreme Court, in
Hudson v Palmer,0 expanded the acceptability of post-deprivation
process to include intentional deprivations:
We can discern no logical distinction between negligent and
intentional deprivations of property insofar as the 'practicability' of
affording predeprivation process is concerned.... For intentional,
as for as for negligent deprivations of property by state employees,
the state's action is not complete until and unless34it
1 provides or
refuses to provide a suitable postdeprivation remedy.
Both Parrattand Hudson concerned property rights. Clearly,
the restriction on local travel (or the heightened risk of loss)
imposed on permitted but not intended road users in Illinois
involves a liberty or life interest as well as property interests. In a
concurrence to Parratt, Justice Blackmun argued that the
acceptability of post-deprivation due process was limited only to
property interests, and that life or liberty interests required predeprivation due process: "I continue to believe that there are
certain governmental actions that, even if undertaken with a full
panoply of procedural protection, are, in and of themselves,
antithetical to fundamental notions of due process. " "
While Justice Rehnquist was not prepared to go as far as
Justice Blackmun in arguing that life and liberty interests must
receive pre-deprivation due process, he clearly argued that life and
liberty interests recognized by a state must receive either pre- or
post-deprivation due process:
It is apparent from our decisions that there exists a variety of
interests which are difficult of definition but are nevertheless
comprehended within the meaning of either "liberty" or "property"
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.

Parratt,451 U.S. at 537.
Id. at 541.
Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976).
Parratt,451 U.S. at 541.
468 U.S. 517 (1983).
Id. at 533.
Parratt,451 U.S. at 545.
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as meant in the Due Process Clause. These interests attain this
constitutional status by virtue of the fact that they have been
initially recognized and protected by state law, and we have
repeatedly ruled that the procedural guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment apply whenever the State seeks to remove or
significantly alter that protected status.3
Justice Rehnquist supported this argument using a stateissued driver's license as an example of such a "recognized 'and
protected" right. The analogy, taken from Bell v Burson, is
particularly applicable because the entitlement it deals with
concerns local travel. The Bell court concluded that a driver's
license was a state entitlement even if its use to secure a basic life
Moreover, as the
necessity was merely possible, not certain.3'
Illinois Supreme Court noted in Boub II, in Molway v. City of
Chicago, it once recognized that bicyclists were part of the general
traffic of the roads, and therefore had the right to expect
Even though the court
reasonably safe and convenient ways."
dismissed Molway as no longer relevant, at one time in its history,
the Illinois Supreme Court did require a duty of care towards
cyclist-road users, therefore creating a constitutional status
"initially recognized and protected by state law," under the
specifications provided in Paul. The Illinois Supreme Court has
the power to withdraw this recognition from cyclists, but
Matthews, Hudson, Paul and Bell require "some kind of process"
directly addressing the removal of an initially recognized and
protected interest. Clearly, under either an expansive or narrow
interpretation of what comprises a liberty interest, and under
either an expansive or narrow interpretation of what process is
due, the removal of a state-recognized liberty interest must receive
at a minimum a post-deprivation hearing of some type.
The Illinois Tort Law appears to violate this condition by
proscribing redress for all permitted but not intended users of
public facilities who suffer injury or property loss because of
negligent maintenance by municipality. However, as Justice
Stevens pointed out in his concurrence in Daniels and Davidson:
Davidson puts the question whether a state policy of
noncompensability for certain types of harm, in which state action
343. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710-11 (1975).
344. 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
345. Id. at 539.
346. 88 N.E. at 486.
A street is made for the passage of persons and property, and the law
cannot define what exclusive means of transportation shall be used. To
say that a new mode of passage shall be banished from the streets, no
matter how much the general good may require it, simply because
streets were not so used in the days of Blackstone, would hardly comport
with the advancement and enlightenment of the present age.
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may play a role, renders a state procedure constitutionally defective.
In my judgment, a state policy that defeats recovery does not, in
itself, carry that consequence. Those aspects of a State's tort regime
that defeat recovery are not constitutionally invalid, so long as there
347
is no fundamental unfairness in their operation.
Stevens specifically listed sovereign immunity as one "aspect
of a State's tort regime" that could be used as a permissible
limitation on recovery,3 " but cautioned that "[t]he fact that an
immunity statute does not give rise to a procedural due process
claim does not, of course, mean that a State's doctrine of sovereign
immunity can protect conduct that violates a federal constitutional
guarantee."349
Such a violation may be grounded in the Constitution's Equal
Protection Clause.
In a 1981 Supreme Court case, Logan v.
Zimmerman Brush Co.,350 the Court evaluated the constitutionality
of an Illinois statute terminating a claimant's cause of action for
violating a statute of limitations, even when the delay resulted
from a state agency's failure to process the application in a timely
manner. 351
Although the majority opinion held the statute
unconstitutional on due process grounds, a plurality chose to add
an equal protection analysis to the decision.
Writing for this plurality, Justice Blackmun admitted that
"Logan's equal protection claim is an unconventional one. The
[Act] ... establishes no explicit classifications and does not

expressly distinguish between claimants.

. .

. ,,"

Nevertheless,

Blackmun found that "the Illinois statute runs afoul of the lowest
level of permissible equal protection scrutiny [i.e., rational
basis] "
The determining factor was that the state statute failed
to classify claims on any standard of merit:
Here, of course the [statute] may operate to terminate meritorious
claims without any hearing at all, while allowing frivolous
complaints to proceed through the entire administrative and judicial
review process. While it may be true that "[n]o bright line divides
the merely foolish from the arbitrary law," I have no doubt that [the
statute] is patently irrational in light of its stated purposes .... It is
true, of course, that [the statute] serves to expedite the resolution of
certain claims ... and in that sense it furthers the purpose of
terminating disputes expeditiously. But it is not enough, under the
Equal Protection Clause, to say that the legislature sought to
terminate certain claims and succeeded in doing so, for that is "a
347. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 342 (emphasis added). Justice Stevens used one
concurrence, in Daniels, to address both that case and Davidson.
348. Id.
349. Id. at 343 n.20.
350. 455 U.S. 422 (1981).
351. Id. at 424.
352. Id. at 438.
353. Id. at 439.
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mere tautological recognition of the fact that [the legislature] did
what it intended to do.""

While the plaintiff and amici curiae briefs in Boub II argued
that bicyclists were intended users of the road, none of them
directly addressed the process by which bicyclists became intended
users. The brief submitted by Wayne Township, on the other
hand, directly confronted the issue:
[PIlaintiff references various provisions of the Illinois Vehicle Code,
various guidelines of the Illinois Department of Transportation, and
the "Rules of the Road for Bicycles" distributed by the Secretary of
State.... This, of course, is beside the point. For purposes of
determining the scope of a local public entity's duty to maintain its
own property ... it is the local public entity's intent which controls,
5
not the intent of any particular individual or of some other entity.

This position was adopted almost verbatim by the Boub H
As discussed in Section II of this Article, this
court. 356
interpretation has increasingly come into conflict with state and
federal transportation policy, state traffic ordinances, and even
local codes. As the Latimer court made clear, just because a traffic
regulation forces a cyclist to operate in the road does not imply
that the use of the street is intended, and that a municipality has
a duty of care.35 ' Intent must be either delineated with signage
and marking or included in the state tort immunity act itself. As
shown by Santelli, a municipality does not have a duty of care
8
even if specified in the state vehicle code."
Although the plaintiffs in Boub H chose not to respond to this
argument,5 9 it is plausible to argue that by allowing municipalities
354. Id. at 440-41.
355. Brief for Appellee at 22, Boub If (No. 84246), available at 1998 WL
34114737.

356. 702 N.E.2d at 538 (Heiple, J., dissenting).
357. 752 N.E.2d at 1165. This is the infamous "cycling equals smoking"
section.
358. 584 N.E.2d at 460. A recent Illinois appeals court case, Anderson v.
Alberto-Culver USA, Inc., 740 N.E.2d 819 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000), casts some doubt
on this. A regional airport failed to maintain smooth runway run-off areas,
exacerbating the severity of an airplane crash. Such run-off areas were
specified in a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Advisory Circular. The
court concluded that "accepting federal state and funding mandated municipal
defendants' compliance with the Advisory Circular surface safety standards
and established their duty of reasonable care." Anderson, 740 N.E.2d at 828.
Federal highway trust funds, passed through the state's department of
transportation, usually trickle down to even the most local level of
government. The 1997 trust fund legislation (due to be replaced in 2004)
contains multimodal advisory compatibility standards. Thus, Anderson may
obviate Santelli.

359. Brief for Appellant at 7, Boub II (No. 84246), available at 1998 WL
34181977. "Plaintiff acknowledges that the intent of the local entity must be
examined .. " Id.
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to separate intended and permitted users from intended but not
permitted users, Illinois creates just the type of "non-classification
classifications," justified only by tautology, that Justice Blackmun
warned of. The "enormity of the burden" test, which holds that
fiscal liability is the primary criterion for determining who is an
intended user, clearly veers the ITIA towards Justice Blackmun's
abyss of tautological classifications. Under this argument, Mr.
Boub would not represent the class of bicyclists, but the class of
permitted but not intended travelers.
There is reason to believe that the Illinois Supreme Court
may be sympathetic to this position. A 1997 case, Best v. Taylor
Machine Works,36 ° concerned a worker injured when a defective
forklift truck failed.
An Illinois act, Act 89-7, limited
compensatory damages for non-economic injuries to $500,000.361 In
addition to damages, the injured worker at trial received
declaratory and injunctive relief that the Act violated several
provisions of the Illinois Constitution, including the Article IV,
section 13 prohibition against special legislation."
The Illinois Supreme Court used two bases for its analysis.
First, special legislation challenges should generally be evaluated
using the same standards as an equal protection challenge.
While the special legislation prohibition was included in the
Illinois Constitution in 1870, a separate equal protection provision
was only incorporated in 1970. 3r Thus, for most of its life, the
special legislation clause provision functioned as Illinois' equal
protection clause.'
Because of its unique history, Illinois courts
generally still use the same standards to adjudicate special
legislation and equal protection challenges."
Second, the court
determined that because Act 89-7 did not involve a fundamental
right or involve a suspect class, rational basis scrutiny must be
used." 7 The court found that Act 89-7 did not even meet this level
of scrutiny. Citing the decision rendered by the trial court, it
stated that the Act "constitutes 'special legislation because it
eliminates fairness and impartiality in the awarding of
compensatory damages, thereby bestowing on certain tortfeasers a
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.

689 N.E.2d 1057 (Ill. 1997).
Id. at 1063.
Id. at 1068-69.
Id. at 1070-71. See also Melbourne, 394 N.E.2d at 1300.
Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1070.
Id. at 1070-71. "Delegates to the 1870 constitutional convention

criticized special legislation because, instead of establishing and enforcing

general principals applicable to every class of citizens, special legislation
enriched particular classes of individuals at the expense of others." Id. at
1070

(citing STATE

OF

ILLINOIS,

DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE
578 (1870).

CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

366. Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1070-71.
367. Id. at 1071.
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disproportionate, undeserved benefit of escaping liability.... .""
Although Best was an Illinois state case interpreting the state
constitution, and Logan was a United States Supreme Court case
interpreting the federal Constitution, the two cases are close
analogs, and Best can arguably be used to extend the edicts of
Logan.3" The capacity of a court to consider closely linked federal
and state constitutional rights together was supported by the
Supreme Court in yet another Illinois-based case, Central Union
Telephone Co. v. Edwardsville,"' in which the majority concluded
that: "It is not, however, a forced or strained interpretation to hold
that 'cases ... in which the validity of a statute or construction of
the Constitution is involved' include validity under, or
37
"
construction of, both [federal and state] constitutions." '
Similarly, Illinois appellate courts use the same analysis in
assessing equal protection claims under both the federal and state
constitutions, 32 and have had no qualms in accepting cases from
trial courts who have failed to specify which constitution gave rise
to their equal protection holdings. 3
The Illinois Supreme Court's 1997 language in Best is eerily
similar to that contained in Molitor, the 1959 school bus crash case
in which the court rejected the state's blanket immunity for school
districts. The following passage is from Molitor: "The difficulty
368. Id. at 1068-69.
369. Even if this assertion is rejected, a comparison of Logan and Best is

warranted. Most likely, any action seeking a judicial overturn of Boub would
contain a supplemental claim based solely on a state constitutional challenge,

and the discussion would be useful in this context. In addition, it should be
recalled that in Monroe v. Pape, the court explicitly stated that § 1983 may be
used in circumstances where a remedy to an invidious law is inadequate in

theory or practice, as well as to challenge the unacceptable law itself. 365 U.S.
167, 174-76 (1961). Thus, an unconstitutional state law that provided no
remedies for its invidious nature could form the basis of a § 1983 claim, even if
the state law itself was upheld by the state's supreme court. Finally, it should
be noted that in revising the Illinois Constitution in 1970, the legislative
commentary to Art. XIII, § 4 of the constitution, empowering the legislature to
grant local government immunity, specifically cautions that any grant of
immunity is "subject to the provisions of the United States Constitution."
Melbourne, 394 N.E.2d at 1301.
370. 269 U.S. 190 (1925).
Illinois had a statute that required appeals of
371. Id. at 195.
"Constitutional" issues to go directly to the state supreme court. Failure to do

so constituted a waiver of the constitutional issues. Because the statute did
not specify whether only state constitution issues were intended, or whether

federal constitutional issues were included as well, the Supreme Court was

asked to determine if it made a difference. The Court said that it didn't. Id. at
194-95.
372. People v. Reed, 591 N.E.2d 455, 457 (Ill. 1992).
373. Garcia v. City of Chicago, 608 N.E.2d 239, 241 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992). It
should be noted that Garciaupheld the (Illinois) constitutionality of a City of
Chicago ordinance that allowed children under twelve to ride bicycles on the
sidewalk, but prohibited those over the age limit. Id. at 242-43.
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with this legislative effort to curtail the judicial doctrine is that it
allows each school district to determine for itself whether, and to
what extent, it will be financially responsible for the wrongs
inflicted by it."374 And this is from Best, almost forty years later:
This court has consistently held that the purpose of the special
legislation clause is to prevent arbitrary legislative classifications
that discriminate in favor of a select group without a sound,
reasonable basis....
The ban on special legislation originally
arose.., in response to the.., abuse of the legislative process by
granting special charters for various economic entities.375
Best describes a history in which the State of Illinois
prohibited its legislature from passing laws to arbitrarily benefit
the interests of one group-one "economic entity"-over another.
Molitor, and its judicial descendents, Harvey,3 7' Lorton377 and
Sullivan,7 8' extend this principle to governmental agencies. The
Illinois court's objection in Best was twofold: first, by statutorily
allowing some entities to self-segregate themselves into discrete
classifications with different degrees of liability, the state violated
the special legislation provision of the state constitution. Second,
such legislation is an improper delegation of judicial power to the
legislature. Molitor and Best also established the principle that
the Illinois Constitution's special legislation clause is, by history
and application, so inexorably intertwined with concepts of equal
protection that the two are inseparable, and that any legislation
that permits local government self-segregation violates that
provision.379
Generally, disparities between persons do not create an equal
protection claim."' The Boub II court concluded that the most
localized level of government is the only one entitled to make the
ultimate determination as to who is an "intended and permitted"
user, 1 a finding that, at first glance, does not initially appear to
violate the general rule. However, in a recent case, Bush v.

374. 163 N.E.2d at 92.
375. 689 N.E.2d at 1069-71.
376. 203 N.E.2d at 576-77.
377. 220 N.E.2d at 163.
378. 281 N.E.2d at 662-63.
379. Melbourne, 394 N.E.2d at 1300. "Whether a particular legislative
enactment violates this special legislation provision is a matter decided upon
standards very similar to those involved in equal protection analysis." Id.
380. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 427 (1961). "[Tlhe Equal
Protection Clause relates to equality between persons as such, rather than
between areas and.., territorial uniformity is not a constitutional
prerequisite." Id.
381. 702 N.E.2d at 541. "We iterate that our inquiry is limited under section

3-102(a) to determining the intent of the local public entity, Wayne Township
in this case. The intent of the DuPage County board is not determinative." Id.
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Gore,382 the Supreme Court found that a judicially-ordered recount
of votes in the 2000 presidential election violated the equal
protection clause because not every county was ordered to recount,
and in those counties that were so ordered, the recount procedure
was not uniform from county to county. The issue, like Boub II,
was one of determining intent:
Florida's basic command for the count of legally cast votes is to
"consider the intent of the voter." This is unobjectionable as an
abstract proposition and a starting principle. The problem inheres
in the absence of specific standards to ensure its equal application.
The formation of uniform rules to determine intent based on these
recurring circumstances is practicable and, we conclude,
necessary.... The search for intent can be confined by specific
rules designed to ensure uniform treatment.383
It could be argued that the Court's holding in Bush was
limited to election procedures-among the most fundamental of
rights. However, the Court's own summary of the issue suggests
that, under some circumstances, it points to a broader need for
geo-political uniformity:
The question before the Court is not whether local entities, in the
exercise of their expertise, may develop different systems for
implementing elections. Instead, we are presented with a situation
where a state court with the power to assure uniformity has ordered
a statewide recount with minimal procedural safeguards. When a
court orders a statewide remedy, there must be at least some
assurancethat the rudimentaryrequirements of equal treatment and
fundamental fairness are satisfied.3 4
Because the Illinois special legislation clause "contains an
express grant of power to the judiciary,"388 a decision by its
supreme court governing its applicability appears to function very
much like a judicial remedy, giving rise to the admonition in Bush
that such solutions must contain the "rudimentary requirements
of equal treatment."
One final point needs to be addressed, dealing with another
federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1985, a successor to section
2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871.38 Section 1985 prohibits those
who "conspire, or go in disguise on the highway or on the premises
of another, for the purpose of depriving, either directly or
indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of
382. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
383. Id. at 530.
384. Id. at 532 (emphasis added).
385. Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1070. This grant is unique: "the prohibition against
special legislation is the 'one provision in the legislative articles that
specifically limits the lawmaking power of the General Assembly.'" Id. at
1069.
386. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 266 (1993).
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the laws... ."'
The expansive possibilities in the phrase "any person or class
of persons" became the subject of much speculation after Griffin v.
Breckenridge,' a 1971 Supreme Court case in which Justice
Stewart cautioned that "[tihe language requiring intent to deprive
of equal protection, or equal privileges and immunities, means
that there must be some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based,
invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirator's
action."'
Previously, this Article discussed a theoretical right of
localized travel in the context of a 1993 Supreme Court case, Bray
v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic. There, Justice Souter's
majority opinion suggested that: 1) if such class-based animus
were applied to all travelers, both intrastate and interstate alike,
and 2) as a result, some interstate travelers were adversely
affected, then a conspiracy to interfere with a federally protected
right (interstate travel) could be established."' In his dissent,
Justice Stevens appeared to assume that the class that defined the
animus was comprised of out-of-state travelers.3 9' But Justice
Souter, noting that the abortion protesters at the heart of the case
were only interfering with women in the last few feet before the
door of the clinic, said that "[s]uch a purely intrastate restriction
does not implicate the right of interstate travel, even if it is
applied intentionally against travelers from other States, unless it
is applied discriminatorilyagainst them." 92
This sentence, "even if it is applied intentionally against
travelers from other States" indicates discrimination between instate and out-of-state clients; the italicized discriminatorily must
refer to some other vector of discrimination for the sentence to
have any meaning. Using the Bray example, if the protesters
singled out interstate travelers for harassment, letting Virginia
travelers into the clinic without opposition, this would meet the
conditions Justice Souter stated when he wrote "even if it is
applied intentionally against travelers from other States." Here
the restriction (harassment) is applied intentionally against
travelers coming from out of state. But if the protesters harassed
only pregnant women, regardless of where they traveled from, this
would meet the description "applied discriminatorily against
them."
There would be a difference between harassing all

387.
388.
389.
390.

42 U.S.C. § 1983(c).
403 U.S. 88 (1971).
Id. at 102 (emphasis added).
Bray, 506 U.S. at 277.

391. "[Tlhe Court assumes that even an intentional restriction on out-ofstate travel is permissible if it imposes an equal burden on intrastate travel."
Id. at 333.
392. Id. at 277.
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pregnant women and all out-of-state people.
If all pregnant
women were harassed, all pregnant women who traveled from
outside the state would be harassed, but if all people who traveled
from out-of-state were harassed, pregnant women from within
Virginia would not be harassed. To have meaning, the phrase
"even if it is applied intentionally against travelers from other
States" must include the class of all interstate travelers, while the
phrase "applied discriminatorilyagainst them" must include the
class of all pregnant women. Tiherefore, Lo discriminate on the
basis of travel origin or on the basis of some other classification
would entail a conspiracy to violate civil rights.
The obvious extension of this argument is that bicyclists
should be considered an "otherwise class-based" group. However,
because bicyclists are not a protected category in either the federal
or state constitutions, any discriminatory classification need only
pass rational-basis scrutiny, and given the narrow confines of this
grouping, finding a corresponding legitimate public interest would
be virtually trivial. This was the conclusion the Illinois Appellate
393
Court reached in Garcia v. City of Chicago,
upholding the (state)
constitutionality of a Chicago ordinance permitting children under
twelve to ride bicycles on the sidewalk, but prohibiting older
riders: "a party... must prove 'by clear and affirmative evidence'
that the ordinance constitutes arbitrary, capricious and
unreasonable municipal action."
But the state supreme court's
standard for determining rational basis under the state equal
protection clause, as articulated in Best, is far more inclusive: "we
must determine whether the classifications created [by legislation]
are based upon reasonable differences in kind or situation, and
whether the basis for the classifications is sufficiently related to
the evil .... ,"' The 1995 Illinois Tort Reform Act was invalidated
because it was unrelated to the means of addressing the perceived
problem,' not because it was vague or arbitrary.
Returning to Justice Souter's opinion, if the applicable
categories addressed by the ITLA are "permitted road users" and

393. 608 N.E.2d 239 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).
394. Id. at 242. There is a wide body of literature supporting the position
that there is no right to travel by a particular means. State v. Scheffel, 514
P.2d 1052 (Wash. 1973) (holding a revocation of driver's license for repeated
traffic convictions was not unconstitutional); Kansas v. Risjord, 819 P.2d 638
(Kan. 1991) (holding regulation of horse drawn or horseback transport on
roadways does not violate Fourteenth Amendment); Mountain States Legal

Found. v. Espy, 833 F. Supp. 808 (D. Idaho 1993) (road closure that removes
most convenient, but not only, means of access to home does not violate right
to travel); Am. Motorcyclist Ass'n v. Park Comm'n of Brockton, 575 N.E.2d 754
(Mass. App. 1991) (park prohibition of motorcycles does not violate freedom of
assembly).

395. 689 N.E.2d at 1071.
396. Id. at 1073.
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"permitted and intended road users," meeting the demands of
equal protection becomes far less problematic. If, for all road users
other than motor vehicles, it is solely the wishes of the local
government that determines if a given subclass of users will be
considered permitted and intended, then the duty of care (or, more
precisely, the waiving of immunity) will vary from municipality to
municipality. However, motor vehicles will be intended users
regardless of where they go because local government intent is
irrelevant-statewide intent was created judicially in Deren and
Wojdyla.
Wayne Township's brief in Boub I asserted that such a
differentiation existed under Illinois law: "In short, while
pedestrians, joggers, horseback riders, and bicyclists may be
permitted users of the road-i.e., they are not affirmatively
prohibited from using the roadway-a local public entity's
responsibility/duty for maintaining the road in a reasonably safe
condition is limited only to intended and permitted users.
And Illinois courts, in the wake of Boub 1I, appear to be
reaching a consensus that no statewide action (other than altering
the ITLA itself) can make a class of users intended: "[I]n the wake
of the Boub decision, it is unlikely that a bicyclist will ever be held
to be an intended user of a municipal street or roadway unless
that roadway has been specifically marked or otherwise
designated as a bicycle route by the municipality."' 8
Recall Santelli, where a township failed to post a newlycreated curve in the road, resulting in a fatal nighttime crash: the
municipality breached a duty imposed by the state itself through
the motor vehicle code, and was still held to be immune.399 The
implications are enormous: no statewide administrative or
legislative act is sufficient to make any currently "permitted" user
a "permitted and intended" user at a particular location unless the
local municipality agreed to implement the change, or the change
was incorporatedinto the Illinois Tort Immunity Act itself. On the
other hand, one defined category of roadway users (motor vehicles)
is considered "permitted and intended" regardlessof the expressed
intent of any municipality, even though section 10/3-102(a) makes
no mention of what groups are intended and which groups are not.
This doctrine, first advanced in Deren (1973) and Wojdyla (1992),
was, in both cases, a bald assertion unsupported by precedent.4"

397. Brief of Appellees at 36, Boub II (No. 84246), available at 1998 WL
34114737.
398. Diefendorf v. City of Peoria, 720 N.E.2d 655, 661 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999)
(Breslin, J., dissenting).
399. 584 N.E.2d at 460. "The Illinois Motor Vehicle code in no way negates
the immunity granted to the City by the Tort Immunity Act for failure to post

warning signs .... " Id.
400. Wojdyla, 592 N.E.2d at 1102-03. "To determine the intended use....
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In other words, the intended/not intended dichotomy is a common
law construction that creates a partial local government override
of legislative and statewide administrative mandates for some
groups, but explicitly preempts this override for others. In neither
case is there any legislative policy input to define the dichotomy.
Returning back to 42 U.S.C. § 1985, if bicyclists are simply
considered a subclass of the relevant legal classification (those
designated under common law as subject to local government
immunity decision making), then a much stronger case can be
made that they are a class-based group, are deliberately
discriminated against, and that this discrimination is invidious
because no rational public policy is served. These elements were
summarized in Bray:
A conspiracy is not "for the purpose" of denying equal protection
simply because it has an effect upon a protected right. The right
must be aimed at; its impairment must be a conscious objective of
the enterprise. Just as the "invidiously discriminatory animus"
requirement.., requires that the defendant have taken his action
"at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse
effects upon an identifiable group," so also the "intent to deprive of a
right" requirement demands that the defendant do more than
merely be aware of a deprivation of a right that he causes, and more
must act at least in part for the very
than merely accept it; 40he
1
purpose of producing it.

Wayne Township's brief in Boub H makes clear that it was
precisely the differentiation of generally-intended users and
locality-dependent intended users that is the purpose of the
Illinois Tort Act:
In this era of tax caps and dwindling government budgets, it would
be patently unfair to permit the intent of some other person or
entity-a user, a planning commission, some agency of the state or
federal government, etc.-to define the scope and extent of a local
public entity's duty of care.... 402
And the Illinois Supreme Court agreed:
We believe that imposition of municipal liability in the
circumstances shown here is more appropriate for the legislature to
initiate, if it is to be done at all. In this regard, it is appropriate to
consider the potentially enormous costs both of imposing liability for
road defects that might injure bicycle riders and of upgrading road
conditions to meet the special requirements of bicyclists.4W
This is, of course, exactly the point the City of Chicago made
These are the indications of intended use." Id.
401. 506 U.S. at 275-76 (citations omitted).
402. Brief for Appellees at 31, Boub If (No. 84246), available at 1998 WL
34114737.
403. Boub 11, 702 N.E.2d at 543.
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in Curatola when it introduced its "enormity of the burden" test.
Lacking a coherent legal structure-the result of reading ITLA's
"intended and permitted" language in isolation from its
"reasonably foreseeable" clause-Illinois courts have given local
governments the power to arbitrarily and invidiously determine
the duty of care owed to a legal user of its roadways, even if such
use is normal and routine. No notice and hearing is required
before such a determination is made-the lack of appropriate
signage, marking and other facilities treatment is per se the only
determinative element. As Justice Heiple warned in his dissent in
Boub II: "Given the majority's ruling, the only safe bicycle in
Illinois
is a stationary exercise bike located in one's home or at the
404
gym. "

404. Id. at 545.

